L H SUGAR FACTORY Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner carried on the business of manufacturing and selling sugar. It is alleged that the petitioner started the practice of giving to his permanent workmen two days' holiday after the cessation of crushing season. The holidays were called as closure holidays. Later the petitioner increased the number of holidays to three. Sometime in 1957 there arose a dispute between the petitioner and its workmen in regard to the closure holidays. The State of Uttar Pradesh referred this dispute for adjudication to the industrial tribunal, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad. The tribunal gave its award on the dispute on 14 April 1958. A copy of that order is annexure a to the affidavit accompanying the writ petition. In the seasonal year 1957-58, the petitioner declared 15, 16 and 17 May 1958 as closure holidays for all workmen who were on the petitioner's muster roll on 11 May 1958. The employees of the petitioner raised the dispute that since the crushing season of the petitioner ended on 6 May 1958 all those workmen whose names were on the muster roll on 7 May 1958 were entitled to the closure holidays within one week from 6 May 1958. The petitioner's case was that the crushing season ended on 10 May 1958. The difference in the dates of the cessation of crushing season is important in the determination of the number of the workmen entitled to get the closure holidays. The number of workmen on the muster roll on 6 May 1958 appears to be greater than their number on the muster roll on 10 May 1958. The State Government referred this dispute to the industrial tribunal, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad. By its award dated 20 November 1959 the industrial tribunal has held that the crushing ended on 6 May and not on 10 May 1958 and that accordingly those workmen who were on the muster roll on 6 May 1958 were entitled to the closure holidays.

(2.) Before going further it may be mentioned that it is not disputed by the petitioner that the crushing of sugarcane ceased on 6 May 1958; similarly it is not disputed by the workmen that some ordinary operations were performed after the close of the crushing of sugarcane on 6 May 1958. The only dispute between the parties thus is: what is the meaning of the expression "at the close of the crushing season" occurring in the previous award. The industrial tribunal upheld the contention of the workmen that this expression signified the stoppage of the crushing of sugarcane and not the close of all manufacturing operations as well as some allied operations. The opinion of the industrial tribunal is essentially founded on its own interpretation of the expression. In support of its interpretation of the expression it has also incidentally taken into consideration two factual circumstances of the case. My reading of the award further is that these additional factual circumstances do not constitute the bedrock of the tribunal's decision.

(3.) It may be well worth here to recall the principles that regulate the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari which the petitioner has asked for in the instant case. It is now well settled that certiorari is issued when an inferior authority has refused to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law or has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has acted in contravention of the principles of natural justice or has been over-reached by the parties to the case before it by fraud. Now there is no doubt that in the instant case none of these principles apply. We are, accordingly, left with the only other principle for the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari which goes by the name of "error of law apparent on the face of the record." It is, therefore, necessary for me to determine in this case whether the award of the industrial tribunal is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. It cannot be disputed that the error must be an error of law and further that that error of law must be a patent and manifest error. If an involved and elaborate argument is required for exposing the error of law, it cannot be said to be an error of law apparent on the face of the record so that the Court will then have no power to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari.