KESARI DEVI Vs. DHARMA DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from an order of a District Judge granting a succession certificate to the respondent. There is no dispute about the facts. The appellant is the widow of Jhunnoo Lal, while the respondent is the widow of his brother Mannu Lal. In 1948 Jhunnoo Lal took an insurance policy from the Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., for Rs. 5,000.00. According to its terms the Company promised to pay the amount of Rs. 5,000.00 on Jhunnoo Lal's surviving the 10th April of the year immediately preceding the expiry of thirty years from the date of the commencement of the insurance, or, off his prior death, to him, or "his Nominees, Executors, Administrators, Assigns or other Representatives, as the case may be," subject to proofs being given of the title of the claimants to the policy. Under Section 39 of the Insurance Act the assured nominated Mannu Lal as his nominee. Thus under the policy, the Insurance Company bound itself to pay Rs. 5,000.00 to the assured) if the remained alive for thirty years, and to Mannu Lal, if he died before completing thirty years. He died within a short period leaving Mannu Lal, and the appellant, his widow. Before the Insurance Company could pay the money to Mannu Lal, as the nominee of the assured, Mannu Lal died leaving the respondent as his legal representative and she applied for money to the Company, which directed her to obtain succession, certificate in proof of her title to it. Consequently the respondent applied to the District Judge for a succession certificate. Her application was contested by the appellant, who claimed that she was entitled to the succession certificate, being the widow and heir of the assured. The learned District Judge holding that, if Mannu Lal had been alive he would have been entitled to receive the money, granted the succession certificate to the widow, and hence this appeal.

(2.) Under the insurance policy the money became payable to Mannu Lal; this means that the Company was bound to pay it to him. Since he died before it could be paid to him, it must be paid to his heir or representative, that is, to the respondent. It must be paid in such a manner as to amount to payment to him. It is only if it is paid into his estate that it can be said to be paid to him (though posthumously), and the respondent is the person who undisputably, represents it. If it had been paid to him as it ought to have been on his death it would have gone to the respondent as part of his estate, and the respondent must be pleased in the position in which she would then have been. The mere accidental fact that he died within a short time of the death of the assured and before the Company could pay the money to him should not make any difference to the respondent and cannot confer any title upon the appellant to receive it. According to the policy the money was to be paid to the assured, it he remained alive for the full period of thirty years, or to his nominees, executors, administrators, assigns or other representatives, if he did not. Since he did not remain alive for the full period of thirty years, it was to be paid to his nominees, executors, administrators, assigns or other representatives-He had nominated Mannu Lal and so it was to be paid to him and not to any executor, administrator, assign or other representative. The conjunction ''or" joining the words "Nominees", "Executors" etc., shows that it is to be paid to any one of them depending on the circumstances. If there is a nominee, it is to be paid to him and not to an executor, administrator, assign or any other representative. An executor, or administrator or any other representative will be entitled to it only if there is no nominee. So the appellant would be entitled to it only if there was no nominee. It is not open to the company to say that it cannot pay the money to the respondent because she is neither a nominee, nor an executor, administrator, assign, or any other representative of the assured. To whom the money is payable is to be seen with reference to the date on which it becomes payable; it became payable according to the policy itself, on the death of the assured, and oh that date there was in existence his nominee, who alone was entitled to receive it. The Company must pay the money to him, and, if he has died in the meanwhile, to his estate. It cannot pay if to the appellant, who does not answer the description "his Nominees, Executors, Administrators, Assigns or Other Representatives in interest". She cannot receive it, and the only other person who can receive it is the respondent, as representing the estate of the nominee.

(3.) This is also what follows from the provisions of Section 39 (1), (5) and (6) of the Insurance Act. Sub-section (1) provides that an assured may nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death; it follows that the insurance company must pay the money in the event of his death to his nominee. The money become payable to the nominee on the death of the assured, and, if the nominee happens to die before actually receiving it, it must naturally be paid into his estate. Sub-section (5) provides that where the nominee dies, before the policy matures for payment, the amount will be payable to the assured or his heirs, or legal representatives, or the holder of a succession certificate, as the case may be. 'This provision evidently makes a distinction between a nominee dying before the policy matures and a nominee dying after it matures but before receiving the payment; in the former case the money will be payable to the assured or his heirs or legal representatives, and it impliedly follows that in the latter case the money will be payable to the estate of the nominee. This is made clear by Sub-section (6) which lays down that the nominee, if he survives the assured will be entitled to receive the money. Mannu Lal would have been entitled to receive the money without any question of succession certificate and, if he died before receiving it, his widow should be entitled to receive it without the necessity of any certificate to the effect that she is succeeding to the estate of the assured; if any certificate is required it would be in respect of her succeeding to the estate of Mannu Lal.