RAM GOPAL Vs. RAM KUMAR AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This special appeal is directed against the judgment and order of our brother Dhawan dated 22nd of Sept., 1959. The facts giving rise to this case are very short. The respondent No. 1 Sri Ram Kumar is the tenant and the appellant Sri Ram Gopal the landlord of a premises situated in the city of Etawah. Sri Ram Gopal applied under Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for permission to sue the respondent No. 1 for ejectment on the ground that the premises was needed for his own use. The R.C.E.O., who was exercising the powers of the District Magistrate, rejected the application whereupon the dissatisfied landlord went to the Commissioner, Allahabad Division. The Commissioner allowed the Revision and remanded the case for rehearing by the R.C.E.O. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, after rehearing the case, granted Sri Ram Gopal permission to sue Sri Ram Kumar for ejectment from the premises in dispute. Sri Ram Kumar preferred a Revision to the Commissioner. Allahabad Division, which was allowed and the order granting permission was set aside. Thereafter Sri Ram Gopal filed a revision application before the U.P. Government (hereinafter called the State Government). On 20-9-1958 the State Government, quashing the order passed by the Commissioner, allowed the application of Sri Ram Gopal for permission to sue Sri Ram Kumar for his ejectment from the premises in dispute. A writ petition was filed against this order of the State Government which was heard by our brother Dhavan who by his judgment dated 22nd of Sept., 1959, as already mentioned above allowed the same and quashed the order passed by the Stale Government. The present appeal is directed against that order of our brother Dhawan.

(2.) The question that has been canvassed before us and requires consideration in the present case is a very short one, the same being as to whether the order passed by the State Government was one contrary to law or was based upon considerations extraneous to the merits of the case. The submission of the respondent No. 1 before the learned Single Judge was that the State Government only considered the need of the landlord and not that of the tenant. This submission was based upon the following words in the order of the State Government:

(3.) There is a clear, reference to the revision application made by the appellant. The order of the State Government read as a whole does not show that it did not look into the entire record of the case and did not consider the needs of the landlord and tenant both. There is a strong presumption that it would have considered not only the needs of both the landlord and the tenant but other relevant circumstances also. The presumption gets stronger in view of the fact that in the writ petition filed by Sri Ram Kumar it was not alleged that the State Government did not apply its mind to the facts of the case or that it did not peruse the material on the record of the case. Sec. 7-F of the Act which confers on the State Government the revisional powers does not provide that the order passed by them should be a speaking order. It is not analogous to Or. XX, C.P.C. or Sec. 367, Cr. P. C. which provide as to what a judgment should contain. Under these circumstances the State Government were not required to draft their order in a particular form. Inasmuch as it has not been contended or alleged that the State Government did not consider all the material placed in the record of the case, it is not possible to hold that they did not actually do so. We may also add that under the provisions of Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act there is a strong presumption that all official acts are properly done. Sec. 4 of the Evidence Act provides that whenever it is provided that the Court may presume a fact it may either regard that fact as proved, unless it is disproved, or may call for evidence of it. The law clearly is that once a presumption has got to be drawn under the provisions of the Evidence Act then the Court must either act upon that presumption or call upon the party to bring evidence. It is not possible for a court not to draw that presumption and also not to call upon the party to bring in evidence. In the case of Emperor Vs. Sibnath Banerji, A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 156 the Judicial Committee after considering the provisions of Sec. 4 and 114 of the Evidence Act held that it must be presumed that the Governor who passed the order of detention of Sibnath Banerji and others had complied with all the requirements of the law. Their Lordships observed as follows:-