RAMGOPAL RAM PRASAD Vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The short point raised in the petition is that the Commissioner of Income-tax was not right in holding that the petitioners revisions were barred by limitation and in refusing to consider them on the merits.

(2.) THE facts giving rise to this petition are that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed orders on the petitioners appeals on January 21, 1949. THE petitioner was not given notice of the date on which the judgment was to be pronounced with the result that the petitioner did not come to know of the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. THE petitioner says that he did not became aware of the said orders before the 20th March, 1953. THEre is discrepancy about this date in the two memoranda of revisions (annexures B-1 and B-2), in one of which the date given in March 20, 1953, and in the other, March 30, 1953. THE petitioner did not file appeals before the Tribunal and no reason at all has been shown why the appeals were not filed. THE petitioner says that he filed revisions before the Commissioner on the 22nd April, 1953, under section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act. It may be stated that the memoranda of revisions, which are annexures B-1 and B-2, are dated the 22nd April, 1953, but the Commissioner in his order, annexure C to the affidavit in support of the petition, states that the revisions were filed only on the 9th May, 1953. It is possible that the memoranda of revisions were drawn up on the 22nd April, 1953, but were not filed until the 9th April, 1953, but were received in the Commissioners office only on the 9th of May, 1953. Be that as it may, this does not make any difference to the position that the revisions were filed after a very great delay and after the period of one year prescribed under section 33A had long expired. In the memoranda of revisions no attempt whatsoever was made to explain the delay in filing the revisions beyond the bald statement that the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dated January 21, 1949, had been received by the petitioner on the 20th March, 1953. Neither in the memoranda of revisions nor in the writ petition before me has any attempt whatsoever been made to explain the delay which was caused beyond the 20th March, 1953, up to the date on which the revisions were filed or were received by the Commissioner. THE period of limitation prescribed under section 33A(2) for revision applications is one year from the date of the order. THE expression date of the order has been the subject of interpretation by a division bench of this court in the case of Haji Ghulam Hussain & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax, in which it was laid down that the expression the date of such order does not mean the date on which the order was communicated, but the date on which the order was actually made. It is true that the case before the division bench was one under the Excess Profits Tax Act and the question of the interpretation of that expression came up for consideration as the expression occurred in rule 17A of the Excess Profits Tax Rules. I am, however, of the view that as the expression is identical and the two statutes, namely, the Excess Profits tax Act and the Income-tax Act, are in pari materia, it is a decision which is equally applicable in the interpretation of that expression in section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act. THE view taken by a division bench of this court is binding on me. I may also state that the Punjab High Court has also taken the same view in the case of Mahabir Parshad v. Commissioner of Income-tax. THE Bombay and the Madras High Courts have taken a different view in Petlad Bulakhidas Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raj Singh and Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, respectively and have held that the expression date of the order means the date of the communication of the order. With great respect, I am unable to persuade myself to take the view, which has been taken in the decisions of the Bomaby and the Madras High Courts, even if it was possible for me to take a different view. Accordingly, the Commissioner of Income-tax was quite right in holding that the revisions before him were hopelessly belated. It may be unfortunate, but having regard to the clear language of the statute the revisions cannot be held to be within time.

(3.) IT is difficult to appreciate how the firms business can be slack and at the same time how a firm can lie dormant. The discovery of the alleged loss of the files a few days back is also entirely vague. I am not at all satisfied that any good ground has been made out for explaining the delay which has been caused in filing this writ petition. On this ground alone this petition is liable to be dismissed.