MUNICIPAL BOARD SORON Vs. GOPI NATH AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE following question has been referred to us for answer:

(2.) THE circumstances in which the question arose can be briefly stated. Sri Gopi Nath was working as a teacher in the Sant Tulsi Das Memorial Higher Secondary School, Soron, district Etah. He was getting a salary of less than Rs. 50 per mensem. The School was a Municipal School under the management of the Municipal Board of Soron. The Municipal Board was a non -city Municipality. On the 17th of December 1952 in the purported exercise of his powers under Section 76 of the UP Municipalities Act (II of 1916) the Executive Officer of the Municipal Board passed an order dismissing Sri Gopi Nath. Before this order of dismissal was passed Government had issued a notification under Section 60 -B of the Municipalities Act directing that in the Municipality in question the Superintendent of the Education Department was to exercise the powers under Cl. (e) of sub.S. (1) of Section 60. The order of dismissal was, however, not passed by the Superintendent of the Education Department but was passed by the Executive Officer. Sri Gopi Nath then filed the suit out of which this second appeal has arisen claiming a declaration that the order of dismissal passed against him by the Executive Officer was ultra vires, null and void. The point he raised was that in view of the notification issued by the Government under Section 60 -B of the Municipalities Act the Executive Officer had no power left to dismiss the Plaintiff under Section 76 of the Act. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court and Sri Gopi Nath went up in appeal. The appellate Court came to the conclusion that the dismissal of the Plaintiff was bad in law and, therefore, decreed the suit. Against that decree the Municipal Board has filed the present second appeal. When it was being argued before Mr. Justice Beg the question we have already quoted was raised and the learned Judge being of opinion that the question was important enough to deserve consideration by a Division Bench referred it to a Division Bench. That is how the case has come to us.

(3.) IN view of this delegation of power, under Section 76 the Executive Officer can pass certain orders against servants of the kinds specified in the section. That section reads as follows: