JAGDATT SINGH Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This case has come to us on a reference made by our brother Oak by his order dated 29-1-1958. The petitioners are bhumidars of certain plots of land situate in village Naithi, pargana Mohammadabad, district Azamgarh. In respect of those plots proceedings for acquisition have been started under the provisions of the Acquisition of Property (Flood Relief) Temporary Powers Act (U. P. Act No. XXXIX of 1948). It is not necessary to narrate all the facts mentioned in the petition, the affidavit filed in support of it, the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit, because the point raised before us is a short one and is one essentially of law. The prayer in the petition is that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the respondent No. 2, the Requisition Officer of Flood Relief, to cancel his order dated 23-3-1956 acquiring the plots in dispute.

(2.) The only submission that has been made before us is that inasmuch as the first proviso to Section 9(1) of the Acquisition of Property (Flood Relief) Temporary Powers Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) provides that the market value referred to in the first clause of Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act shall be deemed to be the market value of such land on the date of publication of the notice or on the 1st day of September, 1959, whichever is less, the said proviso is invalid because it infringes Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the 1935 Act.) The submission is that the word "compensation" means the market value of the property acquired or sought to be acquired. For this proposition reliance has been placed upon Suryapal Singh v. State of U. P. AIR 1951 All 674 (FB) and State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee, AIR 1954 SC 170. It is true that, except when the Legislature otherwise provides, the word "compensation" means the full value of the property sought to be acquired. That is the general principle of the law of Eminent Domain. Section 299 of the 1935 Act reads as follows:--

(3.) In that Act the word "compensation" has not been treated to be a term of art and no special meaning has been assigned to it. Therefore we have to give it its normal dictionary meaning. The effect of the provisions of Section 299 of the 1935 Act is that no law could be framed by any of the Legislatures functioning under that Act with respect to acquisition of property in which there was no provision for compensation, i.e. adequate compensation because compensation means adequate compensation. We are, therefore, clearly, of the opinion that in so far as the first proviso to Section 9(1) of the Act provides that the value of the land either on the date of publication or on the first day of Sept. 1939, whichever is less, be treated to be the value of the property acquired, there is no provision providing adequate compensation or the full market value. The Irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the provision is in the teeth of the provisions of Section 299 of the 1935 Act. In AIR 1954 SC 170 (Supra) the Supreme Court struck down a similar provision in a Bengal Act of 1948 and on the same ground. In that case their Lordships emphasised the fact that the Act being of a permanent nature, between the date of acquisition and the date of the passing of the Act there may be a very long interval during which time prices may have considerably risen and therefore the compensation had got to be determined on the basis of the prices as prevailing on the date of acquisition and not on the date on which the statute is passed. Their Lordships were also impressed by the principle that if there had been an increase in the value of the land the subject and not the State was entitled to its benefit. There is no distinction on principle between the case decided by the Supreme Court and the one before us. In our opinion, therefore, it was not competent for the U. P. Legislature to have enacted the first proviso to Section 9(1) of the Act.