MISRI LAL Vs. JAWALA PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A short question raised in this appeal is whether a notice of termination of tenancy served on the appellant tenant on 14-2-1958 calling upon him to vacate on the expiry of "ek mah" was a valid notice determining the tenancy or not. It was contended on his behalf that the word "mah" used in the notice which was written in Urdu meant a calendar notice and expired on 14th March,1958, i.e., on the 28th day, whereas under the provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act he was entitled to a notice of 30 days. In reply it was urged that the word meant, as in common parlance, a period of 30 days and not after the expiry of a calendar month.

(2.) According to Webster's Dictionary and P. Ramnatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon the word "month" has several meanings such as (1) calendar month, (2) period of four weeks and (3) period of 30 days. If the third meaning was the meaning in which the word was used in the notice it was quite valid. It would be invalid only if it was used in the sense of a calendar month or of four weeks. When the word was ambiguous, being capable of three or more meanings according to one of which the notice should be valid, it is that meaning that should be adopted be-cause the principle is that a notice should be interpreted, so far as possible, so as to be rendered effectual. As long as it was possible to interpret the word "mah" to mean a period of 30 days the appellant tenant was bound to understand it in that sense and could not be heard to say that he understood it to mean a calendar month. It does not matter if there was a reference in the notice to the commencement of the tenancy on 16th of March, this does not at all indicate that the word "mah" was used in the sense of a calendar month and not a period of 30 days. Sec. 3(27) of the General Clauses Act, which interprets "month" is inapplicable because that interpretation is to be adopted only when the word is used in a statute and not when it is used in a private document like a notice to quit. But even when it is used in statute, it may be interpreted to mean a period of 30 days, as was done in Vama Dava Desikar Vs. Murugess Mudali, ILR 29 Mad. 75 . We, therefore, hold that the notice required the appellant to quit after 30 days and was valid.

(3.) In the result we dismiss the appeal but since the respondent himself was partly responsible for this prolongation of the litigation we make no order about costs of the appeal. Appeal dismissed.