DSCL SUGAR HARIYAWAN Vs. CIVIL JUDGE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri J.N. Mathur, learned Additional Advocate General and perused the record. In pursuance to power conferred by section 15 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (in short Act) read with Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 (in short Control Order), the Cane Commissioner exercises jurisdiction to allocate cane purchase centre to sugar mill. The Sugar Control Order has been issued by the Government of India in pursuance to power conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the Government of India has got power to allocate cane purchase centre. However, Government of India delegated its power to the Cane Commissioner. Thus, the Cane Commissioner exercises its jurisdiction with regard to allocation of cane purchase centre in pursuance to the Act as well as Control Order. Section 12-B of the E.C. Act, 1955 prohibits the Civil Court to grant injunction or to make any order for any other relief against the Central Government or any State Government or a public officer in respect of any act done or purporting to be done by such Government, or such officer in his official capacity under the Act. Section 12-B of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 is reproduced as under:

(2.) Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 2.1.2009 which has been passed on the basis of alleged consent is collusive act with the plaintiff and defendants before the Trial Court without impleading the affected sugar mill, i.e., the petitioner, and that too without taking into account the provision contained in section 12-B of the Essential Commodities Act, cannot be permitted to survive.

(3.) A perusal of the plaint, copy of which has been filed with the present writ petition, reveals that in the suit filed by the opposite parties No. 4 to 12, the petitioner was not impleaded as a party in spite of the fact that the cane purchase centre in question was allocated to it. Thus, since the petitioner could not exercise its statutory right with regard to purchase of cane from the cane purchase centre in question, i.e., Louki-1, Louki-2 and Louki-3, the learned Civil Judge while passing the impugned order seems to have exceeded jurisdiction on the basis of the alleged consent arrived at between the opposite parties No. 4 to 12 and 13, more so when the Civil Court has been barred by section 12-B of the Essential Commodities Act to grant such relief. There appears to be an implied collusion between the opposite parties No. 4 to 12 and Dalmia Chini Mill (opposite party No. 13) in procuring the impugned order in their favour.