MAHESH KUMAR VERMA Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner had challenged the impugned termination order dated June 21, 2000. Learned Standing Counsel Sri H.R. Misra states that the said termination order is appealable under Regulation 31 of Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank Staff Services Regulations, 1982.

(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the allegation of the petitioner is that the impugned termination order was passed without holding enquiry against the petitioner hence alternative remedy should not be a ground for dismissing the petition.We do not agree. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna, AIR 1987 SC 71 : 1986 (4) SCC 537 (at paragraph 17), Babu Ram Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Muzaffar Nagar, AIR 1969 SC 556; S.T.O. v. Shiv Ratan, AIR 1966 SC 142.

(3.) In our opinion learned counsel for the petitioner has not correctly understood the aforesaid decisions. These decisions cannot be understood to mean that a writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy merely because the impugned order has been passed without giving opportunity of hearing or was without jurisdiction. In our opinion the correct position is that if opportunity of hearing was not given to the petitioner or that the impugned order is without jurisdiction this can be an additional consideration for the Court in deciding the question whether the petitioner should be relegated to his alternative remedy or not. However, we do not agree that legal position is that if order has been passed without giving opportunity of hearing or the impugned order is without jurisdiction the writ petition can never be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. No such absolute legal proposition can be culled out from the aforesaid decisions. No doubt existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition. However, it is settled law that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction, and one of the grounds on which the Court can refuse to exercise its discretion is that an alternative remedy is available. Whether the petition should be dismissed or not on this ground is in the discretion of the Court, and availability of alternative remedy is certainly a ground for refusing to exercise discretion.