SURENDRA PRAKASH Vs. COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition is filed against an order of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax dismissing the petitioner's application made under Section 18B of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, in part. A few relevant facts need be stated.

(2.) THE petitioner filed his wealth-tax returns for the assessment years 1973-74, 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1976-77, on a single day, namely, October 20, 1978. For the assessment year 1977-78, he filed the return on February 24, 1979. Again, for the next four years, i.e., 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81 and 1981-82, he filed the return on October 21, 1981. For the assessment year 1982-83, he filed the same on September 22, 1983. Assessments were made and proceedings for imposing penalties were also taken. Penalties were imposed on different dates under Sections 18(1)(a) and 18(1)(c) for all these years. It is then that the petitioner made a single application under Section 18B for waiver of the penalties imposed under Section 18(1)(a) as, well as Section 18(1)(c). However, when the petitioner came before the Commissioner for hearing, many of these penalties were set aside in other proceedings as is set out in paragraph 2 of the Commissioner's order, which para is not to be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the petition survived only in respect of the penalties under Section 18(1)(a) for the assessment years 1973-74, 1974-75, 1976-77 and 1978-79 to 1982-83.

(3.) WE are not satisfied that the Commissioner is right in holding that merely because the assessee filed returns on different dates, there is no room for inferring good faith. Good faith is essentially a question of fact and not a question of law. There was nothing wrong in law in the petitioner making one application for waiver for all the ten concerned years. It was one explanation for all the years. In the light of the fact that the obligation to file the return lies on every person whose wealth exceeds the taxable limit by virtue of Section 14(1), the distinction made does not appear to be wholly justified as a rule of law. In other words, what is a question of fact cannot be converted into a question of law.