RAMESHWAR DAYAL Vs. STATE OF U.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The applicant was prosecuted under sections 7/16, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

(2.) According to the prosecution case on 16-10-1977 Chief Food Inspector, Shri B.L. Dohare, checked the shop of the applicant and suspecting the ginger (sonth) kept by the applicant for sale to be adulterated, took a sample thereof after undergoing the necessary formalities under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The sample was sent to the Public Analyst and his report indicated that the sample was insect damaged to the extent of 80.9% and the sound Sonth was only 19.1%. Sanction was duly taken from the Chief Medical Officer, Orai, and thereafter prosecution was launched. The prosecution before the trial court examined the Chief Food Inspector and the Sanitary Supervisor. The accused examined one witness in defence, that is, Prem Chand. The trial court found the applicant guilty and convicted him under Sections 7/16, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and sentenced him to one years R.I. and Rs. 1000.00 fine. Feeling aggrieved, the applicant preferred an appeal. The appellate court maintained the conviction of the applicant but the sentence was reduced from one years R.I. to six months R.I. The sentence of fine was upheld.

(3.) In the present revision, learned counsel for the applicant has challenged the aforesaid two orders on three grounds. It has been firstly urged that as the mandatory provisions of Sec. 13(2) of the Act were not complied with the entire trial was vitiated. As far as the aforesaid question is concerned, it was not taken before the trial court. The point was sought to be raised before the appellate court and the appellate court relying on a decision of this Court reported in 1980 (I) FAC 294 (Jaipal Vs. State) held that the proceedings were not vitiated. The learned counsel for the applicant in connection with this case has urged that the appellate court exercises the power of the trial court and, therefore, the aforesaid case will have no application and the point having not been raised before the trial court would not debar the applicant from raising the aforesaid point in the appeal. In the case of Jaipal (supra) it has been held that according to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) in so far as it provides supply of the copy of the report of the Public Analyst after institution of the case, it was necessary for the applicant to raise an objection to that effect in the trial court. It has been held that since no objection was raised on behalf of the applicant during the trial of the case that the copy of the report of the Public Analyst had not been furnished, it is not open to the applicant now to make any grievance out of it. It is thus clear that in case the objection has not been raised during the trial of the case, the applicant will not be allowed to make a grievance to that effect at a subsequent stage which will include the appeal also. The learned counsel for the applicant has contended that the accused in reply to the question put to him as to whether he was supplied with a copy of the report of the Public Analyst has stated that he was not supplied with that copy. In my opinion what has been laid down in the case of Jaipal (supra) is that the applicant had to raise that objection and also that as to what prejudice was caused to him at the very out set, that is, during the trial of the case. It is evident from the judgment of the trial court that no such objection or no such point was argued before the trial court. The contention raised by the learned counsel therefore, has no substance.