MURTAZA HUSSAIN Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U, P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. The facts in brief, are these : The petitioners claimed to be the transferees from Smt. Gulab Devi, who was treated as the tenure-holder in the ceiling pro ceedings. The prescribed Authority passed his order in the ceiling case of Smt, Gulab Devi on 7-11-1974. Objections were filed by the petitioners under the then Section 14 (3) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act on "9=9-1975. The petitioners claimed in the said objections that they had purchased the land in dispute from Smt. Gulab Devi by a registered sale-deed dt. 26-6-1968 and that they were in possession over the same since after the said purchases. Their grievance was that Smt. Gulab Devi illegally gave the land in dispute in choice as surplus although she was not entitled to do so inasmuch as the said land had ceased to be a part of her holding. They further stated that they had no prior knowledge of the ceiling case against Smt. Gulab Devi. During the penden cy of the said objections the provisions of Sections 14 (3) to 14 (7) were deleted. Therefore, the petitioners moved an application on 17-11-1975 to the effect that their aforesaid objections dated 9-9-1975 be treated as an application under Section 10 (2) of the Act and the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 7-11-1974 beset aside and the holding of the petitioners be not declared surplus and be excluded from the surplus land of Smt. Gulab Devi. The prescribed Authority rejected the application by his order dated 16-12-1975, a true copy whereof is on the record. The Prescribed Authority observed; "in my opinion, the application in question is not maintainable. Hence dismissed. " Thereafter an appeal was filed and the appellate Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the wrong provision was mentioned in the said application by the petitioners and because no prayer for condonation of delay had been made in the said application. The appellate Court also went into the merits of the petitioners' claim based on the aforesaid sale-deed. In my opinion, the Prescribed Authority and the appellate Court misconstrued the law. It is not disputed that when the objections were filed under Section 14 (3) they were then maintainable. The petitioners as a third parties were entitled to maintain the said objections under Section 14 (3) as it then stood. After the said provision was deleted by the U. P. Ordinance No. 31 of 1975, which was subsequently replaced by the U. P. Ordinance No. 11 of 1976 and the latter in its turn was replaced by U. P. Act. No. 20 of 1976, in my view, it was open to the petitioners to have made a request to the Court to treat the said objections under Section 14 (3) to be an application under Section 11 (2) of the Act, of course, with necessary modifications. In my opinion, this was what the petitioners had substantially done in the instant case by their application dated 17-11-1975. It was wrongly stated therein that the objections be treated to be under Section 10 (2 ). However, this wrong mentioning of the statutory provision should not have disentitled the petitioners from getting the necessary relief. In my view, taking into consideration the law laid down by the Full Bench in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills. Ltd. v. Civil Judge and others (1960 A. LJ. 556) and there after by the Division Bench in Dilbagh Singh v. State (1978 A. L. J. 717) the authorities below should have seen to it that the petitioners were not denied an opportunity of putting forward their point of view when they were undoubtedly entitled to do so and had earlier filed their objections under Section 14 (3 ). In my view, no better case can be conceived of than where a person had already filed his objections under Section 14 (3) (when the said provision was on the statute book) and when in consequence of the subsequent deletion of the said provision, he sought to convert his objections into an application under Section 11 (2) of the Act. If such an application is rejected by the authorities below, then in my view, the law laid down by the Full Bench in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Civil Judge (Supra), which was followed by the Division Bench in Dilbagh Singh v. State (Supra) will not be effectuated but will be controverted. Accordingly, I allow this petition and direct that the objections dated 9-9-1975 shall be held to be maintainable under Section 11 (2) of the Act and the order dated 7-11-1974 shall stand set aside so far as the objections of the petitioners are concerned. The Prescribed Authority shall now examine the said objections on merits and decide whether the land which was sold by the sale-deed in the year 1968 was really held by Smt. Gulab Devi and the names of the petitioners were ostensibly recorded over the land allegedly sold to them or whether the purchasers, by virtue of the said sale-deed, were the real tenure- holders of the land sold to them. The Prescribed Authority shall accordingly decide whether such land allegedly sold to the petitioners should be held to be a part of the holding of Smt. Gulab Devi or should be excluded from her holding. The surplus land of Smt. Gulab Devi shall thereafter be determined, In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. .