MEHAR SINGH Vs. REGISTRAR, CO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner was nominated a Chairman of a Cooperative Society under bye-law 46, the proviso where of empowered the Registrar to nominate the members of the first Committee of Management for a period of three years. The petitioner was thus nominated on .6-3-1978. On 19-3-1979 this nomination was cancelled by another order and the Committee of Management was reconstituted and another Chairman was appointed in place of the petitioner. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has come to this Court contending that the order removing him from the Office of the Chairman is arbitrary and ultra vires. The petitioner has been contented on behalf of the respondents who have invited the attention of this Court to bye-law no. 51 under which all the nominated Directors were to hold office at the pleasure of the nominated authority.

(2.) We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. He has invited our attention to Sec. 36 (2) of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act under which the Registrar may remove an office bearer only after affording to him an opportunity of being heard and for reasons to be recorded. This provision is not attracted to the case as no order of "removal" has been passed for any fault against the petitioner. What the Registrar has purported to do is to exercise his "pleasure" under bye-law no. 51.

(3.) Learned Counsel has further contended that pleasure cannot be arbitrary and must be based on some reason and in support of this proposition he has placed reliance on the Manager Gan. Branch Press Vs. Baliappa (AIR 1979 SC 429). We are not impressed with this argument. Baliappa was a Government servant and his rights as Government servant were governed by statutory rules. Any powers exercised under statutory rules in relation to a Government servant had to be exercised on the basis of some reason. In the present case, the petitioner was not appointed to any service or post under the Government, nor did he hold any elected office. Where a statute gives power is any authority to nominate a person to hold office at the pleasure of that authority, the person so nominated cannot subsequently complain against the exercise of that pleasure when it goes against him in the present case what is still worse from the point of view of the petitioner is that pleasure was exercised not under a statutory rule, but under a contractual bye-law of a Co-operative Society. The petitioner has thus no legal right to complain of the exercise of the said pleasure. In deed, it was because of the pleasure of the Registrar that he came to occupy that office and if that pleasure is transferred in favour of another person, the petitioner has no legally justiciable claim against it.