BHAGWAN DASS Vs. FOURTH ADDL DISTRICT JUDGE MEERUT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Respondents 3 and 4 are the landlords of a building which was in the tenancy of one Shri B. D. Sharma. It was vacated by Shri Sharma in the year 1974 and Respondents 3 and 4 made an application under Section 16 (1) (b) of the U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred as the Act) for the release of the buildings in their favour on the ground that they bonafide needed it for their own use and occupation. It appears that an application for allotment was also made by the petitioner. Rule 13 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 as it stood at that time read as follows: "every application under Section 16 (1) (b) shall be a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord and the outgoing tenant on he prospective allottee, if any, shall have no right to file any objection against it. " The Sub-divisional Magistrate Ghaziabad respondent No. 2 exercising the power delegated to him by the District Magistrate in this behalf passed an order dated 13th February, 1975 releasing the building aforesaid in favour of respon dents 3 and 4 on the finding that it was bonafide required by them for their own use. Aggrieved by that order the petitioner filed an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 55 of 1975 before the District Judge. In view of the amendment in Section 18 of the Act made in the year 1976 this appeal was treated as a revision and was dismissed by the IVth Addl. District Judge, Meerut on 12th February, 1979. The Additional District Judge took the view that the petitioner had no locus standi to file the revision. This finding apparently was based on Rule 13 (4) referred to above. He also held that the need of the landlord was genuine. It is this order of the Additional District Judge which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the finding of the Addi tional District Judge on both the points was erroneous. In regard to the finding of the Additional District Judge that the petitioner had no locus standi to file the revision it was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the entire Rule 13 of the said Rules had been substituted by U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Second Amendment) Rules, 1977 with effect from May 25, 1977 and since thereafter Rule 13 (4) quoted above was not in force and since the revision was decided on 12th February, 1979, the Additional District Judge should not have relied on the said Rule 13 (4 ). In other words the argument is that the deletion of Rule 13 as it stood prior to May 25, 1977 by the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Second Amendment) Rules, 1977, was retrospective. Having heard counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that there is no substance in this submission. Rule 13 (4) as quoted above conferred upon the landlord of a building which had fallen vacant a substantive right to have it released in his favour if he was able to establish that he bonafide needed in for his own use, without the intervention of the outgoing tenant or a prospec tive allottee. It is not disputed that both at the stage when the application for release was filed by respondents 3 and 4 and allowed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate as also at the time when the appeal was filed by the petitioner. Rule 13 (4) quoted above was there on the Statute Book. Consequently respondents 3 and 4 had a right to get the release application disposed of in accordance with the said Rule 13 (4) by asserting that the petitioner being a prospective allottee, had no locus standi to oppose their application. It goes without saying that when the petitioner had no locus standi to file objection against the application for release, he certainly on the same ground could not challenge the order passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate by filing an appeal, It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings and unless the deletion of Rule 13 (4) aforesaid by the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Second Amendment) Rules, 1977 was made retrospective either expressly or by necessary implication, respondents 3 and 4 were entitled to rely on the said Rule 13 (4) in opposing the appeal filed by the petitioner. The question which, therefore, falls for consideration is whether there is anything in the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Second Amendment) Rules, 1977 which may indicate that deletion of Rule 13 (4) aforesaid was either expressly or by necessary implication, intended to be retrospective. Rule 1 (2) of these Rules specifically provides that they shall come into force with effect from the date of their publication in the Gazette. These Rules were published in the U. P. Gazette Extraordinary, dated May 25, 1977. Rule 8 of these Rules only states that for Rule 13, "the following rule shall be substituted, namely. " This only indicates that the old Rule 13 has simply been substituted by a new rule with effect from May 25, 1977. It has not been made retrospective expressly and there is nothing therein which may indicate that the substitution of Rule 13 was intended to have retros pective operation by necessary implication. Further, since the old Rule 13 (4) contained a provision dealing with substantive right and not with procedure or rule of evidence, even raising a presumption of its deletion being retrospective would neither be justified nor in consonance with established rules of inter pretation. For the foregoing reasons the Additional District Judge cannot be said to have committed either any manifest error of law or error of jurisdiction in taking the view that the petitioner did not have locus standi to challenge the order of the prescribed Authority in appeal or revision. In this view of the matter I do not find it necessary to consider the second submission made by counsel for the petitioner that the finding of the Prescribed Authority and the Additional District Judge with regard to the hona fide need of respondents 3 and 4 was erroneous. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. But in the circum stances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. .