LAWS(ALL)-1980-2-61

OM PRAKASH Vs. SUSHILA DEVI

Decided On February 22, 1980
OM PRAKASH Appellant
V/S
SUSHILA DEVI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are two cross revisions, one by the tenant and the other by the landlord. The landlord had filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant claiming that the premises were rented out at the rate of Rs. 280/- par month, apart from water-tax and house-tax, and that inspite of a demand for payment of rent the tenants have defaulted. 'the tenants denied that the rent was Rs. 280/- per month, and alleged that it was only Rs. 80/- per month. It was asserted that the notice on behalf of one of the landlords was illegal, and further that the rent had already been deposited in the Court of the Munsif, Kairana, and as such no decree for ejectment could be granted. The trial Court found that the agreed rent was only Rs. 80/- per month, and there was no agreement between the parties for payment of taxes etc. It also held that a notice demanding the rent was sent on the 6th September 1976 and served on the defendants on the 10th September, 1976. After receipt of this nonce they deposited the rent as from the 1st of March, 1976 to 30th Septem ber, 1976 under Section 30 of the Act on the 5th October, 1976 and the rent from 1-10- 1976 to 28-2-1977 on 12th April, 1977, and further that the rent for the period from 1-3-1977 to 31-8- 1977 was deposited in Court on the 26th September, 1977. It also found that the rents for the months of January and February, 1976 have not been paid by the defendants. On these findings it held that the defendants were defaulter, and liable to ejectment. The suit of the plaintiffs for ejectment was decreed, but that for the arrears of rent decreed at the rate of Rs. 80/- per month. Counsel for the defendant has urged that inasmuch as the Court had found that the defendants were in arrears only of rent for the months of January and February, 1976, no decree for ejectment could be passed. Inas much, as before a person can be ejected he should be in arrears for a period of over three months. This argument is not sound. It is necessary to refer to the relevant part of Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act to demonstrate the fallacy of this contention. "that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and " has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand: Provided that in relation to a tenant who is a member of the armed forces of the Union and in whose favour the prescribed authority under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 has issued a certificate that he is serving under special conditions within the meaning or Section 3 of that Act or where he has died by enemy action while so serving, then in relation to his heirs, the words 'four months' in this clause shall be. deemed to have been substituted by the words "one year". On a first flash one gets impression on account of the use of the word 'is' that the tenant must be in arrears of rent not less than four months on the date when the suit is filed. But a close scrutiny of this provision dispels this notion. It will be noticed that a tenant becomes liable for ejectment in case he is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has not paid the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand. The fact that the Legislature insisted on payment of arrears within one month of the date of service of notice of demand clearly shows that unless the tenant has paid the arrears within one month of the date of notice he will be liable to ejectment, the requirements of the- sub-clause would be met. A contrary interpretation would destroy the purpose of the requirement of payment of rent within one month from the date of service of notice upon the tenant. Thus, notwithstanding the introduction of the present test in the first part of Section 20 (2) (a) by the use of the word 'is' this clause must be interpreted as providing ground for ejectment as soon as the tenant has defaulted in payment of the arrears of rent after the expiry of one month from the date of the service of the notice of demand. The contention that as a part of rent had already been sent to the landlord, who had refused to accept it absolved the defendant from ejectment is not correct. The notice demanding rent for the period from 1st January, 1976 to 31st August, 1976 was served on the defendant on 10th September, 1976. The defendant deposited the rent due from the 1st March, 1976 to 30th September, 1976 on the 5th October, 1976. Thus, inspite of this deposit the rent for the months of January and February, 1976 was neither paid to the landlord nor deposited. The trial Court has found likewise, and there is no infelicity in this rending as it has been arrived at on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record. It is obvious that when Section 20 (2) (a) talks of payment of the arrears of rent to the landlord it contemplates payment of the entire amount of arrears, and not a part of it. This is so because after referring to the arrears of rent in the earlier part of this sub-section the words "failed to pay the same" are used. The word 'same' obviously refers to what has been mentioned earlier in this sub-clause, and the earlier part talks not of a part of the arrears of rent but of the entire arrears of rent. That being so, the defaulting tenant has to pay the entire arrears of rent demanded from him and he cannot escape liability for ejectment (subject however to the provision of Section 20'\4) by paying only a part of the arrears of rent which has fallen due. The decree for ejectment was, as such, rightly passed. So far as the revision on behalf of the landlord is concerned the question as to what was the agreed rate of rent and as to whether taxes had to b: paid by the defendants or not is essentially one of the fact. The trial Court has on a proper appraisal of the evidence come to the conclusion that the agreed rate of rent was only Rs. 80,'- per month, and there was no agreement regarding the payment of taxes. It is not possible to interfere with these findings of fact in this respect. Both the revisions filed, failed, and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. The stay order passed in Civil Revision No. 3"456 of 1978 is discharged. .