LAWS(ALL)-1980-8-7

KUNWARJI SARAN SINGH Vs. ADDL DISTRICT JUDGE VARANASI

Decided On August 08, 1980
KUNWARJI SARAN SINGH Appellant
V/S
ADDL DISTRICT JUDGE VARANASI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a tenant's petition arising out of orders passed by the Courts below allowing an application filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 21 (1-A) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. These are the facts. The landlord was in the employment of the Govern ment. He was occupying an accommodation which was given to him for his residence as an employee of the Government. After his retirement he had to vacate the official accommodation and he started living in the house of his brother. On these facts the landlord claimed, the eviction of the petitioner who was admittedly the tenant of the accommodation in question. The application was contested by the tenant who asserted that the landlord did not bona fide require the accommodation in dispute and at any rate as between the landlord and the tenant it was the latter who was bound to suffer greater hardship. The prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlord on the ground that the ingredients of Section 21 (1-A) had been established in the present case and that the landlord was, therefore, entitled to an order of eviction even without comparison of respective hardship. Aggrieved by the order of the Prescribed Authority the tenant filed an appeal, but without any success. Before the learned District Judge, on behalf of the tenant, two grounds were urged (1) with regard to the description of the property and the other that the tenant would suffer greater hardship than the landlord. The learned District Judge decided both these contentions against the tenant and held that there was no discrepancy in the description of the property. On the finding that the landlord did not have any other house of his own after retirement from Government service and that he was forced to reside in the house of his brother as a licensee, the learned District Judge held that the provisions of Section 21 (1-A) were squarely applicable to the facts of the case. The learned District Judge, therefore, dismissed the appeal. Counsel for the petitioner urged that Section 21 (1-A) was not applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the landlord had retired from service before the insertion of Section (1-A) in Section 21 of the aforesaid Act. I do not agree. Sub-section (1-A) which was inserted in Section 21 of by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 reads as follows; " (1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2, the Prescribed Authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment: Provided that an application under this sub-section may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employ ment, but the order of eviction on such application shall take effect only on the date of his actual cessation. " On a plain grammatical construction of the aforesaid statutory provision there can be no manner of doubt that sub-section (1-A) covers the case even of those landlords who had retired prior to the insertion of sub-section (1-A) in the statute. Sub-section (1-A) was, to my mind, enacted for the benefit of those occupying public buildings who have-had to vacate the same on account of their retirement. I see nothing in sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 or even in the scheme of the Act which may countenance the construction sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in J. C, Gupta and others v. District Judge, Dehra Dun and others (1978 A. L. J. 1306 ). The passage relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner reads as follows; "a landlord is entitled under this provision to get the house as he was required to move out of the Government premises. But if after vacating the Government premises, a landlord succeeds in obtain ing possession of a vacant house of his own, he cannot thereafter demand benefit of Section 21 (1-A ). Even after getting possession of a vacant house if he wants additional accommodation, he will have to take resort to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. " This passage does not support the contention of the petitioner at all. What has been said there is that if after vacating the Government premises a landlord succeeds in obtaining possession of a vacant house of his own he would not be entitled thereafter to claim the benefit of Section 21 (1-A ). In the present case the finding is that the landlord after vacating the Government premises was residing in a house belonging to his brother. In the present case the landlord has not, after vacating the official accommodation, succeeded in obtaining possession of any vacant house of his own. Under the circu mstances the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application to the facts of the present case. In view of what has been stated above this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The petitioner is, however, granted four months' time within which he will hand over vacant possession of the accom modation in dispute to the plaintiff-respondent. The petitioner shall not during this period or at any time induct any other person in the accommoda tion in dispute. .