KARORI MAL Vs. EIGHTH ADDL DISTRICT JUDGE KANPUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition is directed against the orders passed by the Courts below decreeing the suit of the plaintiff- respondent No. 3 for the ejectment of the petitioner from certain premises of which the respondent No. 2 is admittedly the landlady and the petitioners are the tenants. The respondent No. 3 filed a suit against the petitioners for their ejectment on the ground that, in as much as, the premises had been let out to the petitioners for running a tea stall i. e. , for business purposes, and the tenants have started using the same for residential purposes, they have rendered themselves liable to ejectment under Section 20 (2) (d) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The suit was contested by the petitioner, who asserted that the accommodation was let out to the petitioner both for residential as well as commercial purposes and that, therefore, the petitioner was not liable for ejectment. Both sides led evidence in support of their respective cases. The learned Judge Small Causes who tried the suit recorded a finding accepting the case of the landlady that the premises had been let out for running a tea stall and not for the residential purposes and that the petitioners have, without the consent of the landlady, started using the same for residential purposes. The trial Court, therefore, decreed the suit of the respondent No. 3 under Section 20 (2) (d) of the aforesaid Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial Court, the petitioner filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. The petitioners absented themselves at the hearing of the revision. The learned District Judge, however, perused the record and found the findings recorded by the trial Court were in accordance with law and were, therefore, not liable to be set aside. He consequently, dismissed the revision. It is pertinent to mention here that the petitioners made no attempt whatsoever to claim a hearing before the learned District Judge in the revision and for setting aside of the expert order. They have straightaway filed a writ petition in this Court and have challenged the orders passed on merits. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that on the finding that the petitioners are both residing in the accommodation as well as running a tea stall, it could not be said that the petitioners are using the accommodation for a purpose which is inconsistent for the purpose for which it was initially let out. I cannot agree. In order to appreciate the point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners it is necessary to have Section 20 (2) (d) of the aforesaid Act which reads thus: "20 (2) (d): that the tenant has without the consent in writing of the landlord used it for a purpose other than the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the building or otherwise done any act which is inconsistent with such use or has been convicted under any law for the time being in force, of an offence of using the building "or allowing it to be used for illegal or immoral purposes. " A perusal of the aforesaid provisions would show that the tenant is liable to be evicted not only when he uses the premises let out to him for the pur poses which is inconsistent with the purpose for which it was initially let out to him, but also if he without the consent in writing of the landlord, uses the premises for a purpose other than the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the building. The words "other than the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy," used in clause (d) of sub-section 20 are words of very wide import and they clearly imply that if the purpose for which the tenant uses the premises let out tc him is other than that for which it was initially let out to him, the tenant would be liable for ejectment. Where the landlord proves that the tenant has used the premises without the consent in writing of the landlord for a purpose other than that for which it was let out to him he becomes entitled to a decree for ejectment without further proving that the two purposes were inconsistent with each other. Of course, inconsis tency of the two purposes is also a ground for ejectment, but it is only an alternative ground for ejectment. On the findings of the Courts below, therefore, that the accommodation was let out to the petitioner for business purposes and that he is now using it for residential purposes the plaintiff had clearly become entitled to a decree for ejectment. The fact that the petitioners are also using the accommodation, besides their residence, for commercial purposes would, to my mind, make no difference to the liability for being ejected. Using the premises for residence is a purpose other than that for which the petitioners were admitted to the tenancy in the building in question. There is, therefore, no substance in the first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on few decisions of this Court namely, 1979 Allahabad Law Journal 1136 and 1968 Allahabad Law Journal 289, neither of which is of any assistance. In the first case, the finding was that the tenant was not using the premises for a purpose other than that for which it was let out to the tenant. The premises had been let out to the tenant for residential purposes and over a small portion of it he was found having stored some articles. On these facts, it was held that on the totality of circumstances it cannot be said that the tenant was using the premises for a different purpose. That case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. The case reported in 1968 Allahabad Law Journal 289 is equally dis tinguishable on facts. The problem with which I am concerned in the present case was neither involved nor considered. In view of what has been stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. The petitioner is, however, granted three months time to vacate the accommodation in dispute. He will hand over vacant possession of the accommodation in dispute to the landlord within these three months. .