KRISHNA KUMARI SHARMA Vs. BIKRAM DEV SHARMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act against an order passed by the Claims Tribunal rejecting an application by the alleged widow of the deceased by which she had prayed for being impleaded in the motor accident claim case, which was already pending. It is necessary to state the relevant facts leading to this appeal. One Sri Pritam Dev Sharma had died by an accident and an application for compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (here-in-after referred to as the Act) was made by Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, who were the brother and sister respectively of the deceased. During the pendency of that case an application was made by the present Appellant claiming to be the widow of the deceased. The reliefs claimed in the application are significant and are re-produced:

(2.) The Tribunal held that the limitation for preferring a claim of compensation on account of the death of the deceased had run out and the application for impleadment was, therefore, not maintainable. The Tribunal also observed that since the claimants who had already made the application under Section 110-A did not admit the Appellant's status as a widow of the deceased, hence the claimants were not bound to implead her in the claim and on that ground also the application must be rejected. Aggrieved by that order the Appellant has preferred this appeal. A preliminary question which needs consideration is as to whether this appeal is competent. Section 110-B reads:

(3.) A plain look at the above section reveals that an appeal lies only against an award given by the Claims Tribunal and, therefore, it is to be examined as to whether the impugned order passed in the instant case -could be deemed to be an award so as to give rise to a right of appeal. The application for compensation has to be under Section 110-A and as Section 110-B provides, on receipt of such application the Claims Tribunal shall "after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid." Thus, it is incumbent on the Tribunal to make an enquiry on receipt of an application under Section 110-A and a claim petition ends in an award given under Section 110-B. Even where there is no adjudication on merits it has been held that in certain circumstances such application can be deemed to have culminated in an award. Thus, for instance, where the application has been made after the expiry of period of limitation and an application for condonation of delay is made and the latter application is rejected and consequently the claim petition is also dismissed, it has been held that this amounts to passing an order which would be appealable under Section 110-D. The reasoning seems to be that an order dismissing a claim petition as barred by limitation has the effect of an order refusing to grant compensation and is as such an award within the meaning of Section 110-B--See Komal Charan v. State, 1971 AIR(All) 503. We are in respectful agreement with that decision and are inclined to hold that where the ultimate effect of the impugned order is to refuse the grant of compensation, it is virtually making an award as contemplated by Section 110-B. This, of course, presupposes that there was a claim petition.