JAGDISH KUMAR KHANNA Vs. SHAKUNTALA DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a defendant's revision. It is direc ted against the judgment decreeing a suit for ejectment as well as for recovery of arrears of rent. The plaintiff-landlords brought a suit for ejectment on the ground that the defendant was a tenant in the accommodation. He did not pay rent for more than three months inspite of service of a notice of demand. He was liable to ejectment. The Trial Court held that the defendant had remitted the rent to the plaintiffs within a month of the service of the notice of demand. He was hence not liable to eviction. The suit was decreed for recovery of arrears of rent alone. The plaintiffs went up in revision. The learned Additional District Judge held that the erstwhil; owner had transferred the property to the present plaintiffs along with the arrears of rent due till January 14, 1969 on which date the sales deed was executed. Rent was due from July 4, 1968 till January, 1969. On January 25, 1969 both the vendor as well as the vendee sent notices to the tenant intimating the transfer of the property as well as of the arrears of rent. The present plaintiffs also served on the defendant a notice demanding arrears of rent due from July 4, 1968. Though the suit was contested by the defendant-tenant but since he did not deposit the arrears of rent due, his defence was validly struck off. Since the defence had been struck off, the defendant was not entitled to lead evidence. His plea that he had remitted the rent to the plaintiffs within a month of the receipt of the notice of demand, was not proved. The learned Judge further held that the Trial Court was in error in permitting the defendant to lead evidence. It was found that the admissible evidence on record established that rent from July 4, 1968 to December 31, 1968 was due. It was not paid to the plaintiffs inspite of service of a notice of demand. Defendant hence committed default and was liable to ejectment. On these findings, the suit was decreed for ejectment as well. Three months time was given to the defendant to vacate the accommodation. Aggrieved, the defendant has come to this Court in revision, Learned counsel for the defendant- applicant submitted that:- ti) in the absence of service of a notice to quit under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act, the suit was not maintainable; (ii) even after striking out the defence, public documents can be filed by the defendant and taken into consideration by the Court; - (iii) the Trial Court could not, in law, after the close of evidence and arguments, correct the evidence; (iv) the District Judge was not, in law, entitled to re-assess the evidence and record findings of fact. None of these points have any substance. The learned counsel did not question the validity of the order striking out the defence for non- compliance of Order XV, Rule 6 C. P. C. He, however, submitted that the defendant was none the less entitled to participate in the proceedings and cross-examine the plaintiffs' witnesses. He invited my attention to Messrs Paradise Industrial Corporation v. Messrs Kiln Plastic Products, A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 309. This case supports the proposition that the defendant can cross-examine the plaintiffs' witnesses. It also lays down that after the defence has been struck off the defendant cannot lead evidence to establish any of the pleas taken by him in the written statement. The defendant's case was that he had remitted the rent to the plaintiffs. The plaintiff and his witnesses denied that. Their cross-examination did not elicit anything worthwhile. The defendant was permitted to appear in the witness box to prove this fact, but since his evidence has to be excluded from consideration there is no material to sustain the plea that the rent had been remitted within time. The defendant had filed the money order coupon through which he had remitted the rent to the plaintiffs, The learned counsel submitted that the money order coupons were public documents within meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence Act. The Court hence was entitled to look into them. The submission is misconceived. Assuming that the money order coupons were public documents yet they could be considered by the Court only after they had been filed by one or the other party. Admittedly, the plaintiffs did not file them. It was the defendant who adduced them as evidence on record. Since the defendant was precluded from filing them in support of the defence taken by him in the written state ment, he could not validly file these documents. The Trial Court should not have permitted him to do so. The learned Additional District Judge was right in excluding these documents as well as the oral testimony of the defendant, from consideration while considering the issues raised in the suit. There is hence no substance in these points. Next it was submitted that the Trial Court could not correct the evidence after it had been closed. It appears that while recording the evidence, the Trial Court has left blank spaces for putting in the numbers of the exhibit marks on the documents admitted in evidence. These blank spaces were filled by the learned Judge in red ink after the close of the evidence. I do not find this action to be materially irregular so as to vitiate the Trial or the decision. Further this point was not taken in either of the two Courts below and I am not inclined to entertain such a technical plea for the first time in this Court. The learned District Judge has not re-assessed the evidence in order to record findings of fact on his own. The Trial Court had found that the plaintiff was the transferee of the accommodation, notice of the transfer had bean served on the defendant, the defendant was in arrears of rent for more then three months, that the plaintiff had served a valid notice on the defendant. It, relying on defendant's evidence further found that the defendant had remitted the demanded rent to the plaintiffs. Since the defendant was not entitled to lead evidence to establish this plea, the learned Additional District Judge was justified in excluding it from consideration. The remaining evidence on record supported the findings except the one relating to the remission of rent by the defendant. The learned Additional District Judge did not re-assess the evidence. He only confined the Trial Court's finding to the valid and admissible evidence on the record. It was then submitted that for lack of notice to quit under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act, the suit was not maintainable. Recently, the Supreme Court has in Dhanqpal Chettiarv. Yesodai Ammal, 1979 (5) A. I. R. 573 = 1979 S. C. 1945 has held that in proceedings governed by "rent Control Acts a notice to quit under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act is not necessary. The accommodation in dispute was governed by Rent Control Acts. The present suit was filed in 1969, when the U. P. Rent Control Act of 1947 was in operation. During the pendency of the suit, that Act was repealed by the Rent Control Act of 1972. All through the life of the present litigation, tile accommodation in dispute was governed by the Rent Control Acts. Prima facie, according to the Supreme Court deci sion, no notice to quit under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act was necessary to maintain a suit for eviction so long as a ground for eviction mentioned in the Rent Control Act was established. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the Supreme Court authority was applicable only to the proceedings launched under the provisions of the Rent Control Acts. It was not applicable to suits filed in the regular Courts. I am unable to agree. The Supreme Court decision is applicable to all accommodations, the right to eviction from which is controlled by legislative enactments. It is immaterial whether the proceedings for eviction are launched before regular Courts or before statutory Tribunals created by the Rent Control Acts. But, in my view, this Supreme Court authority will not be applicable j to proceedings for ejectment in Civil Courts in relation to the accommodation;. | governed by the Rent Control Act of 1972. In respect to such accommodations J Section 20 of the Rent Control Act of 1972 bars suit for eviction of tenants ' except on grounds specified in it. Sub-section (1) provides:- "20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds- (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of notice to quit or in any other manner: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a com promise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding, which is either recorded in Court or otherwise, reduced to writing and signed by the tenant. (2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determi nation of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely, (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Sub-section (1) maks a blanket bar to institution of suits for the eviction of a tenant notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of notice to quit. Sub-section (2) permits a suit but, on one or more of the grounds specified in it. But such a suit will be maintainable only if it is filed after the determination of his tenancy. This is a statutory condition. Determination of bis tenancy is a condition precedent. The mode of determination of tenancy has not been provided for anywhere in the Rent Control Act of 1972. Sub-section (1) refers to determination of tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of notice to quit or in any other manner. It is well settled that the Rent Control Acts do not completely supersede or supplant the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act governing the relationship of landlord and tenant. The Rent Control Act superimposes itself on the relevant and material provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The provisions of the Rent Control Act override and prevail only in so far as they go. Since there is no provision for determination of tenancy in the Rent Control Act, one has necessarily to look to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for determination of tenancy. Some of the methods provided therein are by efflux of time or on the expiration of notice to quit. This is provided by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The phrase 'after the determination of his tenancy' occurring in sub-section (2) of Section 20 refers to the determination of tenancy in accordance with law, i. e. in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. This brings in Section 106. The Supreme Court's decision in Dhanapal Chettiar (supra), is a ruling on the general provisions of the Rent Control Acts operating in the various States of the country. It is not an authority specifically on the Rent Control Act of 1972 enforced in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It does not take into conside ration the express provisions of Section 20 of this Act which require determi nation of tenancy as a condition precedent to the institution of a suit for evic tion of a tenant. The aforesaid authority of the Supreme Court would hence not be applicable so long as the Rent Control Act of 1972 is in operation in this State. According to Section 20, a suit for eviction of a tenant can be validly instituted only after the determination of his tenancy, inter alia, by a notice to quit under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that there is no finding that the tenancy has been determined by a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant. Its validity was questioned in defence. The Trial Court found that the notice was valid. I have seen this notice. It was a combined notice of demand and quit. It determined the defendant's tenancy in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is noticeable that the validity of the notice to quit was not questioned. In this view, the suit was validly instituted. The various points urged in support of the revision, having failed, the same is dismissed with costs. Ths defendant must vacate the accommodation within three months from today during which period the decree for ejectment shall not be executed. .