LAWS(ALL)-1980-9-13

PREM KUMAR Vs. FOURTH ADDL DISTRICT JUDGE MEERUT

Decided On September 12, 1980
PREM KUMAR Appellant
V/S
FOURTH ADDL DISTRICT JUDGE MEERUT Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition is directed against an order passed by the learned IV Additional District Judge, Meerut allowing a revision filed by the respondent No. 2, the landlady of the premises under Section 18 of U. P. Act, No. XIII of 1972. By the impugned order, the learned District Judge has held that the building in question ceased to be an accommodation on the date of the allotment made in favour of the petitioner by the Rent Control and Evic tion Officer and that consequently, it could not legally be subject of allotment or a relase under the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. It appears that there was a building of which the respondent No. 2 was the owner and landlady. On the ejectment of one Sita Ram, an erstwhile tenant of the landlady, proceedings for release of the building were initiated by the landlady. The petitioner also applied for allotment. While this application was pending consideration, an application was filed by the landlady to the effect that the building in question had ceased to be an accommodation as a result of destruction caused by a storm. The petitioner, however, alleged that the roof of the building had been removed by the landlady herself and that in as much as, on the date of the application it was in existence as an accommodation, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did have jurisdiction to allot the building. Upon the application of the petitioner, the Rent Control Inspector was asked to submit a report on the condition of the building. The Rent Control Ins pector submitted a report on 17th April, 1978 to the effect that the building in question had ceased to be an accommodation. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer however, allotted the building to the petitioner, Aggrieved, the landlady filed a revision which has been allowed by the learned District Judge on the finding that on the date on which the matter of allotment or release came up for consideration before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, there did not exist any accommodation within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. On that finding, the learned District Judge set aside the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Learned counsel for the petitioner first submitted that the learned District Judge should not have disposed of the matter himself. He should have reman ded the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. I find no substance in this argument. The question whether there existed an accommodation capable of being allotted was a matter relating to the jurisdiction of the authority. On the material already existed on the record, the learned District Judge was able to come to a finding that there did not exist any allotable building on the date of the allotment. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion or warrant for remanding the case. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the District Judge fell into a manifest error of law in relying upon the report of the Rent Control Inspector, inasmuch as, the petitioner had not been given any notice of the date on which the Inspector proposed to make a local inspection. I find no substance in this plea. The petitioner filed a detailed objection as regards this report before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. A true copy of this objection has been annexed to the counter-affidavit and is marked as Annexure G. It is significant that in this objection, the petitioner did not raise any grievance such as is being raised before me in this petition. The petitioner did not complain before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the Inspector had made the inspection without notice to the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be heard to make that sort of complaint for the first time in these proceedings. Learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that if there existed a construction on the date of the application for allotment, the fact that the construction ceased on the date on which the matter of allotment or release was taken up could be no ground for refusing to-pass an order of allotment. Learned counsel contended that the important date is the date of making of the application. I agree with the learned District Judge that if on the date on which the question of allotment is being considered by the authorities, the accommodation in respect of which proceedings for allotment were initiated ceases to exist, the authorities shall have no jurisdiction to allot the same. In my view, the relevant date is the date on which the matter of allotment is being considered. If the subject-matter itself does not exist on that date, there is no question of exercising the powers of allotment. The view taken by the learned District Judge is, therefore, correct. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on two decisions of this Court reported in 1980 Allahabad Rent Cases 369 and 1977 Allahabad Rent Cases 428 in support of his above mentioned contention. These cases are clearly distinguishable. In those cases, it has been held that the Prescribed Authority dealing with the application under Section 21 does not lose jurisdiction over the subject-matter by the mere fact that the accommodation in the meantime might have fallen down. These cases have no relevance to the present controversy. An application under Sec. 21 is filed against a sitting tenant. The rights of a tenant continue notwith standing the fact that the building under tenancy may fall or be destroyed. It is because of this legal incidence that an application under Section 21 cannot be disposed of as having become in fructuous by the destruction of the building. A prospective allottee has no such vested right in a building in respect of which he makes an application for allotment. That is the distinction between a case covered by Section 21 and one covered by Section 16 of the aforesaid Act. The view which I have taken on this question finds support from a deci sion of this Court in the case of Sana Ullah v. The VIII Additional District Judged ). In view of what has been stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. .