MUNICIPAL BOARD Vs. JAI ENGINEERING WORKS LTD.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal by the Municipal Board, Allahabad. The Respondents in this appeal are (1) Jai Engineering Works Ltd., 29 Hewett Road, Allahabad and (2) The Addl. Commissioner, Allahabad Division. This appeal arises out of a writ petition filed by the Municipal Board Allahabad, Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the order of the Addl. Commr., Allahabad Division dated 20 -8 -55 and further praying that opposite party No. 1 Jai Engineering Works Ltd. be directed not to apply for refund in enforcement of the said order.

(2.) THE facts contained in the affidavit of the Petitioner indicate that M/s. Jai Engineering Works Ltd., hereinafter called "the importers" carry on the business of import and sale of Usha sewing machines. In the course of their business, the importers receive sewing machines which have to be taken within the area of the Allahabad Municipality. In June 1954 the importers had received 28 Usha sewing machines. On 17 -6 -54, the importers brought a railway receipt and an invoice to the Head Octroi Office, Allahabad, Under Rule 159 of the Municipal Account Code for having the said railway receipt stamped and for paying the octroi leviable thereon. The value of the goods as declared by them was Rs. 3,600/ -. An octroi of Rs. 112/8/ - was assessed thereon. The octroi as determined by the Octroi Superintendent was paid by the importers at the Central Barrier. The importers, however, filed an appeal against the order dated 17 -6 -54, under which the octroi had been assessed on the goods. This appeal was heard by the Addl. Commr. and allowed by him on the ground that the Board was not competent to impose any octroi duty on the import of sewing machines. The octroi realised by the Board was accordingly ordered to be refunded.

(3.) ON behalf of the Appellant it is argued before us that on a proper interpretation of this rule only sewing machines and type writers which are imported for the specific purposes mentioned therein are exempt from octroi duty. On the other hand, on behalf of the Respondent No. 1, the importers, it is argued before us that under this entry all sewing machines and type -writers would be exempt from octroi duty irrespective of the purposes for which they are imported. We find it difficult to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the Respondent No. 1. If it was the intention of the rule makers to exempt all sewing machines and type writers from octroi duty, then nothing could have been easier for them than to mention these two articles by name as separate items exempt from all duty, instead of mentioning them as mere illustrations of the item which is described in the main clause as restricted and qualified by the purpose of its import. The illustrations appended to the main clause appear to be illustrations merely of machines worked by manual power which could be or are capable of being imported for industrial or educational purposes. In any case, in our opinion, it would not be justifiable or reasonable to construe these illustrations which are mere instances as overriding altogether the provisions of the main clause which precedes the specification of instances or as divorced altogether from their context. The instances from part and parcel of the general clause and are, in fact, in our opinion, governed by it. To tear them altogether from their setting would be not only doing violence to the integrity of the clause but also be violating the fundamental rule of construction that the primary duty of all courts entrusted with the task of interpretation is, as far as possible, to effectuate the intention of the law makers. The interpretation suggested on behalf of the Respondent would result in nullifying the basic purpose of the rule makers which is contained in the principal clause and would result in the complete removal of certain restrictions which it appears to be the intention of the rule makers to impose. The 4 object of the rule makers in exempting machines imported for industrial purposes appears to be the promotion of economic progress in a country struggling to rise in the field of industry and enterprise. Similarly the exemption of machines imported for educational purposes appears to be to encourage the social well being of the community in the educational sphere. These purposes may be described as charitable. Their purpose certainly was not to exempt all machines which are worked by manual power, but only such machines as are imported for certain specific purposes the achievement of which was, in their opinion, conducive to the economic or social welfare or progress of the community. In order to give effect to this purpose, the rule makers qualified the words "machines worked by manual powers", by the subsequent restrictive clauses indicating that such machines are exempt from octroi not in all cases, but only "when used for industrial or educational purposes." Any other interpretation of this item would, in our opinion be unreasonable and unwarranted. If the interpretation suggested on behalf of the Respondent is accepted then the qualifying words "when used for industrial or educational purposes" will become quite superfluous and unnecessary. It is an ordinary canon of construction that any interpretation which results in attributing surplusage to a law making authority should be avoided at all costs.