RAJJAN LAL Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question which has been referred to this Bench is :

(2.) In my opinion the answer to the question referred to us lies in a narrow compass. It is not contended, nor could it be successfully contended, that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply only to an appeal or an application for a review of judgment or for leave to appeal for which a period of limitation is prescribed in the third eolumn of the first schedule to that Aet. It is the settled view of this Court that unless the word 'prescribed' in the Limitation Act is qualified by appropriate words it means prescribed by any law : Durag Pal Singh v. Pancham Singh, AIR 1939 All 403 (FB). It is also common ground that unless (as held by this Court in Mohammad Ibrahim's case, AIR 1958 All 691), the terms of'Section 417(4) of the Code make manifest the intention of the legislature that the period of limitation shall not be extended, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply unless the Cr. P. C. is a special or local law within the meaning of Section 29 of the former Act.

(3.) The Cr. P. C. is clearly not a local law. The expression 'special law* has not been defined in the Limitation Act, but it is defined in Section 41 of the I. P. C. as a law applicable to a particular subject; and that in my opinion is its essential moaning. The Madras High Court in Kandaswami Pillai v. Kannappa Chetty, AIR 1952 Mad 186 (FB), was of opinion that the C. P. C. was a general and not a special law. When considering this question Rajamannar, C. J., said