SITA RAM Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE simple question raised in this revision application is whether the complaint filed on 30-4-1958 for an offence under the Factories Act, 1948, the commission of which came to the notice of the Inspector on 31-1-1958, was "within three months of" the latter date or not. Under section 106 of the Factories Act no court can take cognizance of an, offence punishable under the Act unless complaint thereof is made "within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector. " if the period of three months is computed after excluding 31-1-1958, it is admittedly within three months, but if 31-1-1958 is taken to be the first day of the period of three months the complaint is admittedly not within three months. In B. P. Thakur v. State, 1959 All LJ 317 :AIR 1959 All 787, I took the view that Section 12 of the Limitation Act applies, that consequently the date on which the offence came to the notice of the Inspector is to be excluded in computing the period, of three months and that even apart from Section 12 under the common law that day is to be excluded. Sri Jagdish Sarup asked me to reconsider the view taken by me; I have heard him but I am not persuaded to hold that the view is incorrect.

(2.) SRI Jagdish Sarup contended that Section 292, Limitation Act, refers to a period of limitation prescribed for "any suit, appeal or application" and that a complaint such as that referred to in Section 106, Factories Act, is not a "suit, appeal or application". It may be granted that a complaint is not a suit or appeal but I see no reason to hold that it is not even an application. The word "application" has not been defined anywhere and has no technical meaning. It is defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary to mean "the action of making an appeal, request or petition to a person. " A complaint is nothing but a petition or request to a Magistrate to take notice of an offence committed by a certain person and to punish him after a trial. It is simply an application requesting a Magistrate to take certain action. Merely because the basis on which action is sought against a person is an accusation against him, a complaint does not cease to be an application.

(3.) REALLY it is immaterial whether the first limb of Sub-section 2 applies or not; what is material as whether the second limb applies or not. It lays down that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by any special law the provisions contained in section 12 shall applyin so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by the special law. Sri Jagdish Sarup contended that this second limb applies only in a case governed by the first limb; I do not agree. Barring the word "and" there is no connection whatsoever between the two limbs. Unless some words are imported one cannot say what connection there is between the two-limbs. It would not suffice merely to say that the two limbs are connected with each other; one would, have to ascertain in what manner they are connected,. e. , how the second limb is dependent upon the first lirnb. The only connection that can be imagined between the two limbs is that the second limb applies only when the first limb applies,. e. , when a special law prescribes for any application a period of limitation different from that prescribed by the First Schedule for the purpose of computing the period, the provisions contained in Section 12 shall apply. In other words the provisions of Section 12 are not to apply if a special law does not prescribe for an application a period of limitation different from that prescribed therefor by the First Schedule. There is nothing in the language used in the second limb to support this contention. But, on the contrary, the repetition of the words "by any special or local Act" indicates that the second limb is not at all dependent upon the first limb and is an independent provision. A special law may prescribe for an application a period of limitation which is either the same as, or is different from, that prescribed therefor by the First Schedule; the first limb governs the second alternative but the second limb may govern both the alternatives and contains nothing to suggest that it governs only the second alternative. If it was intended to govern only the second alternative one would have expected it to be worded differently. It would have been enough for the Legislature simply to say