GHAFOOR DARZI Vs. RAM NATH MISIR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a decree-holder's appeal and it raises an interesting question of limitation. The decree in execution was for money passed on 16th November 1983. On 6th November 1936, it was put into execution, but the application for execution was struck off on 23rd November 1936, Another application for execution was made by the decree-holder on 17th March 1944. Objection was taken to this by the judgment-debtors on the score of limitation. This objection was allowed, although in view of the decree having meanwhile been amended under the Debt Redemption Act on 9th September 1945, the Court observed in its order that the question of the effect of the amendment under the said Act was left open. Then the application for execution of the amended decree, out of which the present appeal has arisen, was made by the appellant on 29th April 1945 (1948?). The judgment-debtors-respondents again objected to the execution on the ground of limitation. The execution Court dismissed the objection, holding that the application being within three years of 9th September 1945, when the decree had been amended, it was within time under the provisions of Article 182 (4), Limitation Act. The lower appellate Court, disagreeing with this view, held that the decree having already become time-barred before it was amended on 9th September 1945, it could not be put into execution, even though the application for execution was within three years of the date of the amendment of the decree, which in this case, as we have said, was 9th September 1945. The only question emerging for decision, therefore, in this appeal is whether, in a case where the decree sought to be executed had already become time-barred before it was amended, the application for execution of the amended decree being within three years of the date of the amendment, such an application is or is not within time.

(2.) There can be no doubt that, before the passing of the present Limitation Act, there was a conflict of judicial opinion on the question whether a decree which had already became time-barred but was subsequently amended could be put into execution on an application made within three years of the amendment. The cases in which this point arose were decided with reference to the provisions of Article 179, Limitation Act of 1877. That article did not include any provision analogous to Clause (4) of Article 182 of the present Limitation Act, In order, presumably, to settle this conflict the legislature added the said clause to the present Article 182, and the question is whether, on a correct interpretation of the same, it would still be open to us to hold that, although the application for execution is within three years of the date of the amendment of the decree, it should be held as time-barred on the ground that the amendment of the decree had been made after the decree had become 'dead', as the learned counsel for the judgment-debtors has argued.

(3.) Fortunately, we have a decision of the Judicial Committee, namely the case in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, A. I. R. (19) 1932 P. C. 165: (60 Cal. 1) which furnishes a safe guide for ascertaining the true legal position in this case. At page 167 of the report their Lordships said: "But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide."