VED BRAT Vs. SHASHI DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is the defendant's Second Appeal, being aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 17.11.1991 passed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Sitapur in Regular Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1988 whereby the First Appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the 3rd Additional Munsif, Sitapur in R.S. No. 379 of 1983 dated 20.04.1988 by which the suit of the plaintiff-respondent no. 1 was decreed for a relief of cancellation of sale deed dated 01.06.1982.

(2.) The above second appeal was admitted by this Court by means of the order dated 06.12.2017 on the following substantial questions of law which are being re-produced hereinafter for convenient perusal. 1. Whether the first appellate court could legally decide the first appeal without framing the points for determination, giving its decision thereon and recording the reasons for the decision, as mandated by the provision contained in Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. Whether the registration of the sale deed in question dated 01.09.1982, in which the plaintiff/respondent acknowledged the receipt of the agreed sale consideration of Rs.10,000/-, gives rise to a presumption of due execution of the sale deed after receipt of the consideration, as provided in Sections 58, 59 and 60 of the Registration Act?

(3.) Whether after recording a finding that after execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff/respondent's father Heera Lal deposited Rs.10,000/- in his account, the first appellate Court was justified in drawing an inference from this finding itself, that the plaintiff/respondent did not get any consideration, when Section 2 (d) of the Contract Act, 1872 defines consideration as: "(d) When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise;"? 3. In order to appreciate the submissions of learned counsel for the respective parties, certain brief facts giving rise to the above second appeal are being noticed hereinafter.