LILADHAR Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) JANARDAN Sahai, Member (J) and Lt. Gen. P.R. Gangadharan, Member (A).- Present: Shri R.C. Singh, Counsel for the petitioner and Shri R.N. Singh, Sr. Standing Counsel for the respondents. This transferred application was received by the Tribunal from the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench. The applicant has challenged the punishment of dismissal and R.I. for a period of five years by modification made by the confirming authority under section 154 of the Army Act. By an order dated 19.4.2010 we had granted bail to the applicant. By means of this application, the applicant has prayed for suspending the sentence awarded to the applicant during the pendency of the transferred application. A Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Vikram Anand v. Rakesh Singh, AIR 1995 HP 130 has relied upon an order of the Apex Court that grant of bail in appeal pre­supposes the suspension of sentence. The order of the Supreme Court has been quoted in that decision which is as follows :

(2.) LEARNED Counsel for the applicant, however, submits that the order passed by us requires clarification. While the sentence of imprisonment awarded by a Court Martial can be suspended by the Tribunal under section 15 (6) (e) of the Act it is a matter requiring consideration whether the Tribunal can grant bail after conviction by a Court Martial, hence the need for this ap­plication for suspension of sentence. In these circumstances it has become neces­sary for us to examine the powers of the Tribunal in the matter of release during the pendency of an appeal of a person convicted by Court Martial or during the pendency of a transferred application or in an original application directed against conviction by a Court Martial. Section 3 (o) of the A.F.T. Act defines service matters and the definition would cover convictions by a summer Court Martial where sentence of dismissal or of rigorous imprisonment of more than three months is awarded and in such cases whether or not an appeal lies an original application may lie under section 14. It is to be noted that sub-section 6 of section 15 relates to the powers of the Tribunal. It does not contain any restrictive words which may confine its application to an appeal. It would apply to an original application, a transferred application as well as to an appeal. Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that in the circumstances, a specific order for suspending the sentence of imprisonment has to be passed be­fore granting bail. There is no specific provision for grant of bail in an appeal. Section 15 (3), however provides for grant of bail in the following terms :

(3.) CLAUSE (d) of sub-section (6) of section 15 provides for the release of the convict, if sentenced to imprisonment on parole with or without conditions. This leads us to examine the distinction between an order of bail on the one hand and parole on the other hand. Bail has a well known condonation. Bail under the general law can be granted at the investigation stage or during the pendency of the trial under the provisions of section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Bail can also be granted under the general law during the pendency of an ap­peal in view of section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The literal mean­ing of the word 'bail' is 'surety'. A temporary release of a prisoner on furnishing surety is termed as bail. In law even while a person is on bail he remains under the constructive custody of the Court either through the surety or if he has been released on personal bond under the terms and conditions of the bond. The word 'parole' has its origin in military law where it was used for release of a pris­oner of war on promise to return to custody vide State of Haryana v. Mohender Singh, AIR 2000 SC 890. The word 'parole' does not have any mention in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The grant of parole, however, was introduced in administrative in­structions/rules regarding release of prisoners. An incident of parole which has become well recognized is that the period undergone during parole has to be counted in the sentence awarded to the parolee. The distinction between bail and parole has been exhaustively considered by the Apex Court by a Constitution Bench in Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, 2000 (40) ACC 656 (SC) AIR 2000 SC 1023.