SUGHAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the service of the notice to engage another counsel in place of his earlier counsel Sri Keshav Sahai was served upon the application in pursuance to the order dated 15-10-1999 on 10-11-1999. This fact is available from the report of Chief Metro-politan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, dated 18-11-1999. The applicant has not engaged any other counsel. In this view of the matter, the hearing of this revision is taken up with the help of learned state counsel.

(2.) I have examined both the judgments of the conviction. In the present case, the conviction has been based solely on the ground that Gajar Ka Haluwa, sample of which was taken by the Food Inspector from the applicant's shop, was coloured with a prohibited coal-tar dye. Use of some coal-tar dye is permitted by Rule 28 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Any dye other than one referred to in Rule 28 cannot be used. In the circumstances, the applicant was convicted by the trial Court and his appeal also was dismissed by the lower appellate Court. There is no controversy with regard to the fact that the sample was coloured with a prohibited coaltar dye as aforesaid.

(3.) Only one contention appears available from the judgment specially from the appellate Court's judgment i.e. with regards to the compliance of Sec. 13 (2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (to be hereinafter called 'the said Act'). Section 13 (2) of the said Act envisages that immediately on the launching of the prosecution an intimation along with report of the public analyst shall be sent to the accused by local health authority to enable such person, if he so desires, to make an application to the concerned Court within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the report to get his sample retained by the local health authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 clearly indicates that such an application is to be moved by the applicant within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of the copy of such report. The prosecution evidence shows that in all likelihood report is received by the accused. It does not stand to reason that the prosecution has no liability to see that the report is received by the accused. No doubt, it is generally the endeavour of an accused to either refuse such a notice or some how to avoid its service upon him but even then the prosecution cannot be absolved of such an obligation.