VIJAY PRAKASH Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard and perused the impugned F. I. R. of case crime No. 137 of 2000, under Sections 406, 420, 504, 506, IPC, P.S. Dibiyapur, district Auraiya. According to the allegations made in the F.I.R. the complainant supplied plywood and other goods worth R. 78,740/- to the petitioners on their assurance that they would pay the price thereof within three days. But, it is further alleged, the petitioners failed to pay the price after expiry of the period aforestated and when complainant demanded the price of the plywood supplied by him he was abused and threatened of being killed on 12-4-2000. It is also alleged in the F.I..R. that the cheque issued was dishonoured. It has been vehemently submitted by Sri U.C. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the ingredients of none of the offences mentioned in the F.I.R. are made out in the FIR and as such it is liable to be quashed. Shri Mishra placed reliance on Radharaman Sahu v. Trilochan Nanda, 1991 Cri LJ 1603, a judgment of Orissa High Court and Venkatachalam v. State 1998 Cri LJ 3189, a decision of Madras High Court. In the first case, the complainant had supplied some goods to the accused on credit and when requested the payment in cash, the accused prevailed over the complainant to accept cheques giving the impression that he had sufficient funds in his account. The cheque bounced. In the circumstances of that case, it was held that it could not be said that any deception or fraudulent or dishonest inducement was practised by the accused and that in the fact situation of the case it would amount to breach of contract and it did not amount to cheating. In the second case it was held that the dishonest intention cannot be inferred for bouncing of cheques issued for existing dues.

(2.) In our opinion, the submission made by the learned counsel cannot be sustained. It has been held, in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, (1999) 2 JT (SC) 112 : (AIR 1999 SC 1216) inter alia, that it is not necessary that complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of the complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging; that it is not necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent; and that the crux of the postulate is the intention of the person who induces the victim of his representation and not the nature of the transaction which become decisive in discerning whether there was commission of offence or not. The Apex Court observed that since the complainant had stated in the body of the complainant that he was induced to believe that respondent would honour payment on receipt of invoices, and that the complainant realised later that the intentions of the accused therein were not clear inasmuch as the accused after receiving the goods sold them to others and still he did not pay the money, "prima facie" case was made out for investigation by the authorities.

(3.) In L.V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar, AIR 1983 SC 1219 the Supreme Court has held : "The High Court, we cannot refrain from observing, might well have refused to invoke its inherent powers at the very threshold in order to quash the proceedings, for these powers are meant to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection when there is reason to believe that the process of law is being misused to harass a citizen.