MAHAMANI Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner herein challenges the detention order dated 26-2-1999 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Tiruchirappalli City, Tiruchirappalli against Panchu alias Panchanathan under the provisions of S. 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') The Detaining Authority has given detailed reasons in support of the order. However, we need not go into the said reasons in view of the fact that the learned counsel for the petitioner has restricted himself to a singular attack of technical nature.

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the mandatory provision of Section 3(5) of the Act has been breached in this case inasmuch as the report of the detention order or the approval thereof by the State Government has not reached the Central Government within seven days from the date of detention order or the approval. It is contended in the Counter filed on behalf of the Union of India in paragraph 3 that the report envisaged under Section 3 (5) of the Act about the detention of Thiru. Panchu alias Panchanathan was made by the Government of Tamil Nadu to the Central Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs vide their letter dated 8-3-1999 and that the said report was received by the Central Government in the concerned Desk of Ministry of Home Affairs on 17-3-1999. The learned counsel points out that the detention order having been passed on 26-2-1999, this communication would clearly be beyond the period of seven days as envisaged by S. 3(5) of the Act. He further submits that there is nothing on record to show as to when the said detention order was approved by the State Government. The learned counsel has heavily relied on the Supreme Court judgment reported in 1975 SCC (Cri) 360 : (1975 Cri LJ 1751) (Sher Mohammad v. State of West Bengal) as also the Division Bench judgment of this Court passed in H.C.P. No. 645 of 1999 dated 8-9-1999 (E. Thalaimalai v. State of Tamil Nadu).

(3.) The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, however, points out that the communication by the State Government dated 8-3-1999 cannot be said to be a belated communication beyond the period of seven days, as the State Government could have communicated to the Central Government regarding the detention order and the grounds even after the State Government had accorded approval to the said detention order. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the State Government had approved the said detention order on 2-3-1999. According to him, if the State Government had sent the communication to the Central Government intimating the facts of detention order and the approval on 8-3-1999, there would be no question of breach of Section 3(5) of the Act. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, if the State Government had despatched the report to the Central Government on 8-3-1999, it would be on the 6th day of passing of the order of the approval and, therefore, within time. In short, the contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the relevant date to be taken into consideration for the purposes of Section 3(5) of the Act would be that a date on which the State Government has despatched the report and not the date when it has reached the Central Government.