THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU, MADRAS AND OTHERS Vs. J. DEVARAJAN AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two writ appeals arise out of orders in Writ Petition Nos. 86 and 101 of 1979 dated 27-4-1984. The Services of the respondent in Writ Appeal No. 242 of 1985 and the respondent in Writ Appeal No. 293 of 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the respondents') were terminated as a result of disciplinary action taken against them by the third appellant after holding a departmental enquiry. The orders of the 3rd appellant were confirmed on appeals by the 2nd appellant and further confirmed on revisions by the 1st appellant. Aggrieved by the orders of termination, the respondents preferred Writ Petition Nos. 86 of 1979 and 101 of 1979. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (as he then was) by separate orders of even date, set aside the orders of termination referred to above. The State, aggrieved by the orders of the learned Judge, has preferred these writ appeals.

(2.) The respondents were removed from service on the same set of charges for being found in the company of prostitutes in House No. 34, IV Avenue, Ashok Nagar, on the night of 4-6-1976 and in not having taken action against the pimp and prostitutes. Therefore, the evidence, the defence and the orders, though separate, are more or less similar in both the cases. Even though the learned Judge has passed separate orders, in substance they are similar. We, therefore, propose to deliver a common judgment as the arguments advanced by learned counsel on both sides were common. In fact, the arguments were advanced only in Writ Appeal No. 242 of 1985 and the learned counsel on both sides submitted that those arguments may be taken as arguments for Writ Appeal No. 293 of 1985 also.

(3.) The learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellants mainly submitted that the learned Judge went wrong in converting the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution as though this is a court of Appeal instead of restricting the scope to determine whether the enquiry was held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice were not violated. It was, according to the learned Government Pleader, open to the learned Judge to find out whether there was some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officers are guilty of the charge. It is the grievance of the appellants, according to the learned Government Pleader that the learned Judge instead of restricting the scope of enquiry as mentioned above, has reviewed the evidence thread bare to arrive at independent finding on the evidence. This, according to the learned Government Pleader, is contrary to several decisions of the Supreme Court and, therefore, the orders of the learned Judge cannot be sustained in law.