(1.) THE order of reference by the Division Bench in this case reads as follows :
(2.) TO appreciate the views expressed in the two pronouncements of the Division Benches of this court, referred to in the order of reference, it has become necessary to extract section 46 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, hereinafter referred to as the Act :
(3.) IT may be that the language used in the provision presents some difficulty in appreciating its real scope. With regard to statutes which impose pecuniary burdens on the subject, the court has to look merely at what has been clearly and expressly said. IT is not open to the court to bring in the theory of any intendment. There could not be any equity about a tax. There could not be any presumption as to a tax. Nothing should be read in and nothing should be implied. The court has to look fairly and squarely at the language used in the provision. This rule of strict interpretation may not always ensure to the benefit of the subject. But, that shall not alter the duty of the court to tax him. If the subject comes within the letter of the provision, then he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the mind of the court. These are well-accepted propositions, always kept in mind by the court, while interpreting statutes imposing pecuniary burden on the subject. IT was observed in A. Kandaswami Pillai v. CED [1969] 73 ITR 564, 569 (Mad) :