R JESUDASAN Vs. K SELVARAJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two writ appeals concern the controversy between a private school, of which the first-respondent is the correspondent-Secretary, and its Headmaster the appellant herein, who has been sent out of service. The statute that will govern the controversy is the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (Tamil Nadu Act 29 of 1974 ). hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The facts require delineation as follows: On 9th April 1976, the Headmaster wrote a letter as follows:<FRM>JUDGEMENT_3_TLMAD0_1989Html1.htm</FRM> On 10th April 1976, the resignation of the Headmaster was accepted by the private school and the Headmaster was relieved from duty. On 10th May 1976, the Headmaster preferred a complaint to the second-respondent, complaining that the letters of resignation were obtained from him under duress and threat and prayed for an order, directing his reinstatement. On 30th August 1977. the second-respondent, opining that, since the Headmaster tendered resignation and the same has been accepted by the private school, no appeal would lie, did not entertain the same and go into the merits of the case. The Headmaster appealed to the third-respondent in C. M. A. No. 75 of 1977 and the third-respondent, by order dated 27th June 1978, expressed the view that the appeal is maintainable before the second-respondent, since a case of a teacher, going out of service on resignation would also come within the set of expressions 'otherwise terminated', occurring in Sections 22 and 23 of the Act, and remitted the matter back to the second-respondent for consideration of the merits of the case. The third-respondent, for arriving at this view, took note of the pronouncement of V. Balasubra-manyam, J. , in K. Rajeswari v. T. P. Sankaran and Anr. S. A. No. 1607 of 1974, Judgment dated 25th November 1977 -concisely reported in 1977 TLNJ 537 ). The second respondent, pursuant to the above order of remand, went into the merits of the case and held that the Headmaster tendered his resignation voluntarily and the letters of resignation were not obtained from him under duress and in this view rejected the appeal of the Headmaster. The second-respondent also repelled the contention of the Headmaster that a prior approval, as contemplated under Section 22 of the Act, is required, on the reasoning that in the case of voluntary resignation the question of prior approval does not arise. The Headmaster preferred C. M. A. No. 66 of 1980 to the third-respondent. The third-respondent, on the question of the letters of resignation being taken from the Headmaster by exercise of threat or coercion, rendered a finding against the Headmaster. However, on the question of prior approval, as contemplated under Section 22 of the Act, the third-respondent held that even a case of a teacher going out of service on his own resignation would come within the set of expressions 'otherwise terminated', found in Section 22 of the Act, allowed the appeal of the Headmaster, setting aside the order of the second-respondent and consequently setting aside the order of termination, passed by the first-respondent, and gave the Headmaster the relief of reinstatement. The third-respondent also took note of the pronouncement of V. Balasubramanyam, J. in K. Rajeswari v. T. P. Sankaran and Anr. (supra ). The private school filed W. P. No. 5757 of 1981, questioning the decision of the third-respondent in C. M. A. No. 66 of 1980. The Headmaster filed W. P. No. 10245 of 1981, questioning the finding of the third-respondent that his (Headmaster's) resignation was voluntary and not obtained by force. The learned single Judge, who heard the writ petition, rendered a decision, which is reported in K. Selvaraj v. R. Jesudasan and Ors. (1983) II MLJ 406. Before the learned single Judge, the Headmaster would contend that a case of resignation would also come within the ambit of the set of expressions 'otherwise terminated', occurring in Section 22 of the Act. In answer, the private school would maintain a contrary position. The Headmaster would further say that the finding rendered in C. M. A. No. 75 of 1977 that a case of resignation would come within the ambit of the above expression having been not agitated against and set at naught by the private school, has become final and conclusive as between the parties and would operate as res judicata and debar the private school from raking up the question once again. The Headmaster would also contend that his resignation was not voluntary. Of course, the private school would repel this contention and advance a proposition that it was voluntary. On the contentions and the counter contentions, the learned single Judge posed three questions for consideration as follows:

(2.) WE can first dispose of W. A. No. 580 of 1982, since the position in law with regard to the propriety of this Court examining the factual aspects on a question like this exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is a well settled one and there is no scope for bringing in any ambiguity with regard to the application of the rule to the instant case. There is the finding by the second-respondent that the resignation of the Headmaster was voluntary. The factual aspect has been discussed threadbare by the second-respondent, when he arrived at the conclusion against the theory of the Headmaster. This question was again gone into by the third-respondent in C. M. A. No. 66 of 1980. The third-respondent renders a finding that neither the private school nor any one under it would have forced the Headmaster to resign from the job. The third-respondent has also gone into the factual question in detail, when he came to the conclusion that the contention of the Headmaster that he was forced to resign cannot be accepted. The learned single Judge, while deciding the third question, has also adverted to the findings of the third respondent and further by himself did not find any substance in the contention raised by the Headmaster on this factual aspect. Apart from principle, we are not persuaded to take a view different from that of the learned single Judge on this question. In P. Kasilingam v. P. S. G. College of Technology (1981-I-LLJ-358), the act of the High Court, in a writ petition, converting itself into a Court of Appeal, for re-examining the factual findings, rendered by the Tribunals below, was frowned upon in the following terms at p. 361:

(3.) THE points which call for our serious attention are those raised in W. A. No. 579 of 1982 and the primary point is common to the other writ appeals, which we are dealing with separately.