T.C. SRINIVASAN Vs. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR (APPELLATE AUTHORITY UNDER THE TAMIL NADU SHOPS AND ESTABLISHMENT ACT) AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition is directed against the order of the first respondent in T.S.E. No. 25 of 1982. That was an appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 41 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, with reference to the second respondent dispensing with the service of the petitioner. The body of the order dated 1.11.1979 dispensing with the services of the petitioner passed by the second respondent reads as follows:

(2.) MR . K.N. Ramesh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would contend that the factors pleaded for dispensing with the services of the petitioner as per the order dated 1.11.1979, have not at all been proved to be existing at the relevant point of time and no reasonable cause has been made out and there could not be a waiver by an employee of the statutory provisions beneficial to him and the first respondent erred in not going into the question as to whether the dispensing with the services of the petitioner by the second respondent was for a reasonable cause, and on the other hand first respondent viewing the acceptance of the settlement of monetary benefits by the petitioner as conclusive on the question, has rejected the appeal of the petitioner, and this is not proper.

(3.) MR . Dwarakanathan, learned Counsel for the second respondent did not raise a disputation over the proposition that the employee could not waive statutory provisions conferring benefits on him. Except where there is dispensing with the services of the employee for reasonable cause or for proved misconduct in an enquiry conducted therefore, the order of dispensing with the services of an employee by the employer is not to be countenanced. This is the import of Section 41 (1) of the Act. Hence, in the instant case, there is a need on the part of the Appellate Authority, namely, the first respondent to go into the question as to whether there was a reasonable cause for the employer, namely, the second respondent to dispense with the services of the employee, namely, the petitioner. The present case is not a case of dispensing with the services of the petitioner for a proved misconduct in an enquiry conducted therefore. Obviously there is an omission on the part of the first respondent to go into the question of reasonable cause and adjudicate over the same. The first respondent is not in order in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner on the simple ground that he has accepted full and final settlement of his accounts pursuant to the order of termination. If, in fact, no reasonable cause within the meaning of the provisions of the Act existed and has been made out for dispensing with the services of the petitioner which is a requirement of law the acceptance of amounts in settlement of monetary benefits by itself will not disable or estop the petitioner from raising the question of want of reasonable cause. The first respondent is not correct in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner, as he did on the only ground of acceptance of monetary benefits by the petitioner. The first respondent ought to have gone into and adjudicated upon the question of existence or otherwise of reasonable cause for dispensing with the services of the petitioner by the second respondent.