COMMISSIONER FOR HINDU RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS ADMN DEPARTMENT MADRAS 34 Vs. KANNIAPPA NAICKER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment of Ratnam , J. , in Appeal No. 922 of 1977. Appeal No. 922 of 1977 in its turn is directed against the decision in o. S. No. 10002 of 1974, on the file of 12th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court , Madras . That was a suit instituted by the Original respondent, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, who is no more, and whose legal representatives have been brought on record, under Section 70 (1) of the Tamil Nad u Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 22 of 1959, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for setting aside or cancelling the order of the appellant in A. P. No. 84 of 1974 and also for a declaration that the institution in question is a private temple of the family of the respondent, not coming under the purview of the provisions of the Act. The original proceedings were those instituted before the concerned Deputy Commissioner under the Act for reliefs alternatively under Section 63 (a) and (b) of the Act. A. P. No. 84 of 1974 was the ultimate proceedings before the appellant and whose decisions gave the provocation for the respondent to resort to the civil process as he did above. The respondent succeeded in the civil process before the first Court and this obliged the appellant to come to this court by way of Appeal No. 922 of 1977. The learned Single Judge dealt with the points urged before him on behalf of the appellant and found it fit to dismiss the appeal and the appeal was dismissed. . That is how the Letters Patent Appeal has come to be preferred by the appellant.

(2.) MR. V. Sridevan , learned Special Government Pleader, appearing for the appellant, urged before us three points. The first point is that the respondent having asked for reliefs in the alternative under Sections 63 (a) and (b) of the Act and having obtained the relief under Section 63 (b) of the Act, it was not open to the respondent to agitate the matter further either by way of an appeal before the appellant and further by way of the Civil Process. This point, in our view, has ben rightly repelled by the learned single Judge. Clauses (a) and (b) in Section. 63 of the Act are two of a number of other clauses enabling a person, who has got a cause to seek the reliefs contemplated therein, to set the process or processes in motion. There is no indication in that provision, namely, Section 63 of the Act that one or the other of the reliefs , could be asked for only in the alternative, and even if asked for in the alternative, the party who obtains either of the alternative reliefs could not express a further grievance with reference to the other relief or reliefs which, though covered by him, was denied to him. It must be taken to be settled that even when the plaintiff asked for alternative reliefs , there is no legal presumption or assumption that having obtained one of the alternative reliefs , he gives up the main or the primary or the other relief and he must be satisfied with what he got of the alternative reliefs asked for by him. It does not mean that when the main or the primary or the other relief is denied to the plaintiff, he could not be stated to be an aggrieved person of such denial, on the reasoning that he has obtained the alternative relief. The decision of the first Court, in so far as it negatives the main or the primary or the other relief, is materially adverse to the plaintiff. In other words, he has been denied or deprived of something to which, according to the plaintiff, he is entitled. In that sense the plaintiff is an aggrieved person, who could competently resort to the appellate process as against that decision of the first court, adverse to him. There could be an exception and that is where the plaintiff has acted or conducted himself in such a manner as to approbate the judgment and decree given to him such as taking the benefit thereunder and Pursuant thereto and in such a case it could be stated that he cannot be permitted to reprobate the judgment by which he got that benefit, though other relief was denied to him by it by appealing against that portion of the judgment by which the other relief is denied to him. Such is not the position pleaded and demonstrated either before the first Court or before the learned single judge or before us. The question of legal propriety of seeking for alternative reliefs and agitating against the denial of one of the reliefs asked for, has been dealt with by a Full Bench of this Court, to which we have been a party in P. Kathavan Servai v. Rahima Beevi , 1989 T. L. N. J. 65, we are of the view that the ratio of the decision has got relevance for the purpose of the present provision also and can be safely and appropriately applied to cases under the said provision. Apart from the reasons expressed by the learned single Judge, when he repelled this line of thinking by the appellant, with which reasons we concur, for the reasons expressed by us also as above, we do not find a warrant to throw out the case of the respondent on this ground. Accordingly, this point fails.