LAWS(MAD)-1989-4-45

LINGAM Vs. R SEKHAR

Decided On April 13, 1989
LINGAM Appellant
V/S
R SEKHAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE lorry-owner, made liable by the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal to answer in full the Award, exonerating his insurer, has filed the present appeal contending that the liability ought to have been fastened on his insurer alone.

(2.) FACTS as per the claim briefly are: On 21. 7. 1979 the first respondent was travelling in a lorry No. MDN. 5868 belonging to the appellant, accompanying a load of fertiliser belonging to his employer, Kunjakshan. The lorry was driven in a rash and negligent manner. It capsized, throwing the first respondent outside, resulting in serious injuries to him. He, therefore, filed M. C. O. P. No. 169 of 1980 under S. 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (the Act for short) before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Principal Subordinate judge), Coimbatore, claiming a total compensation of Rs. 20,000 3. The second respondeat resisted the claim contending that the vehicle was not driven in a rash and negligent manner and also contending that the first respondent was travelling in the lorry unauthorisedly without the knowledge of the driver and in contravention of Motor Vehicles Rules prohibiting travel in the rear portion of the lorry and as such the liability could not be fastened on it. The claim was also excessive. The appellant adopted the counter filed by the second respondent.

(3.) THE factual findings should first be settled. It is contended by the second respondent that the first respondent could not have been travelling in the cabin as contended by him but should have been travelling in the rear portion of the lorry without the knowledge of the driver. This was so, since others who were actually in the cabin had not been injured when the lorry capsized, while the first respondent alone was thrown out of the vehicle and had sustained injuries. R. W. I had also given evidence to that effect. I am, however, unable to accept this version put forward by the learned counsel for the second respondent. It is impossible to accept the theory that without the knowledge of R. W. I, the first respondent could have got into the rear portion of the lorry; particularly when even according to R. W. I there were others also travelling in the cabin. It would have been impossible for the first respondent to get into the rear portion of the lorry without the knowledge of any one of them and that too in broad day light. THE first respondent should have been travelling only in the cabin of the vehicle and that too with the consent and knowledge of the driver of the vehicle, as the others in the cabin were travelling.