SUREKHA Vs. THE UNITED BANK OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The landlady is the petitioner in this civil revision petition, which seeks to revise the orders of the Courts below, dismissing an application filed by her for an order of eviction against the respondent herein under Sec. 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as amended by Tamil Nadu Act XXIII of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act. According to the case of the petitioner, she is the owner of the house bearing door No. 5. Sir Theagaraya Road, Madras -17, having purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 10th March, 1975 and the first floor of the premises was even then tenanted by the respondent herein on a monthly rent of Rs. 400 the tenancy being reckoned according to English calendar. After the purchase by the petitioner, the respondent attorned the tenancy in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner claimed that the property was purchased by her with the intention of using the entire building for the residence of the petitioner and her family. Elaborating this requirement, the petitioner claimed that her husband is looking after the family charities and estate and he requires enough space in the building for the purpose of attending to the administration of the charities and their estate in order that it may facilitate proper administration of the same and in order to secure this, the petitioner stated that accommodation was necessary to enable her husband to do so. In addition, the petitioner also claimed that of her two daughters, one of them had reached marriageable age and separate and more convenient accommodation for her is necessary. After issuing a notice terminating the tenancy, the petitioner filed an application for eviction on the grounds referred to above.

(2.) The respondent herein contested this application on several grounds. The respondent admitted that it was a tenant of the first floor right from 1st January, 1964 onwards. It was also further contended by the respondent that there were disputes between the petitioner and the respondent on account of a demand for increased rent by the petitioner which was not accepted by the respondent and this took the shape of interference by the petitioner with certain amenities enjoyed by the respondent, which resulted in an application by the respondent H.R.C. No. 928 of 1976 for the restoration of those amenities. The respondent further contended that the grounds put forth by the petitioner for additional accommodation are vague and totally devoid of particulars and that the provision of separate accommodation for the daughter of the plaintiff is inconsistent with the accommodation claimed on behalf of the petitioner's husband. Another plea was also raised that the services of the respondent would fall under the classification of essential services and therefore, no order for eviction can be passed. The application by the petitioner was characterised as not bona fide and it was also stated that the application does not satisfy the requirements of Sec. 10(3)(c) of the Act.

(3.) The learned Rent Controller (7th Judge Court of Small Causes, Madras) held that under Sec. 10(3)(c) of the Act, the petitioner cannot demand additional accommodation for and on behalf of the members of her family. Dealing with the claim of the respondent that it is engaged in essential services, the learned Rent Controller held that the respondent is not entitled to claim any immunity from eviction on this ground. The learned Rent Controller further held "that the hardship, which may be caused to the petitioner, if this petition is not allowed will out -weigh the numerous advantages put to the respondent, herein". On these conclusions, the application was dismissed. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner herein preferred an appeal in H.R.A. No. 322 of 1977 to the Appellate Authority (Second Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras). The Appellate Authority held, concurring with the learned Rent Controller, that under Sec. 10(3)(c) the landlord can seek "additional accommodation only for the business which she was carrying on and not for the purpose of her husband's business," On this finding, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal.