T.N. UNNAMALAI ACHI Vs. SAMINATHA PATHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this revision, the tenant under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act (Act 18 of 1960), hereinafter referred to as the Act is the petitioner. The respondent herein is the landlord within the meaning of the Act. The landlord sought the eviction of the tenant under S. 10 (3) (a) (i)of the Act, on the ground that he required the buildings bearing Panchayat door Nos. 95, 95 -A and 95 -B,; Thiruthuraipundi Road, Mutbupet, Thiruthuraipundi Taluk, for his own occupation. Both the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate -Authority countenanced the state of the landlord and the tenant faded an order of eviction by orders of Court. The present revision is directed against the orders of the Appellant Authority. Though the findings are concurrent by the Tribunals under the Act, yet, I am obliged to interfere in revision in view of the fact that the orders of the Tribunals suffer infirmities on account of a misconception of the correct position of law applicable to the facts of the case. Certain facts are not in dispute and cannot be disputed. Admittedly, the buildings bear three door numbers. Each of these three door numbers was let out at different points of time, the first in 1967, the second after 1968 and the third in 1970. The premises bearing door No. 95 -B is being used for banking business; the premises bearing door No. 95 -A it being used for cooking purposes and the premises bearing door No. 95 is being used as a bedroom. From October, 1970, a console, dated tent of Rs. 100 is being paid for all the three premises. Mr. M. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner, urges two points in the main for upsetting the decisions of the Tribunals below. The first contention is that when admittedly there are three premises let out, two for residential purposes and the third one for non -residential purposes and at different points of time, a single petition would not lie to evict the tenant from the three premises. The Appellate Authority has chosen to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Chetti v/s. Gartesan, (1976) 1 M.L.J. 27 (S.C.) for the proposition that a single petition with regard to two different tenancies in the same premises, one for residential purpose and the other for non -residential purpose, is maintainable when the tenancy is one. The Appellate Authority has chosen to treat the tenancy as a single tenancy in view of the fact that from a later point of time a consolidated rent of Rs. 100 is being paid and received as between the parties. The facts of the case dealt with by the Supreme Court are different and they are not similar to the facts of the present case. There, the premises was same and the tenancy was also single and in the said circumstances the Supreme Court found justification for countenancing a single petition when two purposes, one residential and the other non -residential, were served obviously by two different portions of the same premises. Such is not the case here. Here, we are faced with three different premises, bearing different door number. Each door number may constitute a 'building' within the meaning of S. 2 (2) of the Act. Each building serves a different purpose. In Gopalakrishna Chetti v/s. Ganesan, 1976 1 MLJ (S.C.) 27 the case advanced by the landlord was one under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. Here, the landlord seeks eviction under S. 10 (3)(a)(i) of the Act, Anantanarayanan, C.J. in Umsalma Bibi v/s. Lakkia Gowder, 80 L.W. 165, was confronted with a case involving several tenements and the learned Judge was called upon to decide as to whether a single application for eviction could be maintained under S. 14 (l) (b) of the Act. After considering the definition of a building under S. 2 (2) of the Act, the learned Judge opined that the landlord must file separate applications for each building or tenement as defined in the Act for the purpose of S. 14 (l)(b) of the Act. But the learned Judge, however, declined to interfere in revision on the ground that no prejudice has been caused to the tenants by the composite application filed by the landlord. Anantanarayanan, C.J. in Govindasami Naicker v/s. Katwar, 82 L.W. 137 reiterated the principle which the learned Judge evolved in Umsalma Bibi v/s. Lakkia Gowder, 80 L.W. 165, that in all such cases the real question is, whether there has been any prejudice caused to the tenant by the said procedure of filing a single petition.

(2.) In the present case, there are three different premises; two serve purposes residential and the third one serves purposes non -residential. The provision that is sought to be set in motion by the landlord against the tenant is under S. 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act. The question that comes up for consideration is, whether the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant under S.10 (3) (a) (a) (i) of the Act, where the premises is nonresidential and when he could not make out a case for his requirement of the nonresidential premises, which the provisions of S. 10 (3) (a) (2) or (3) alone would be applicable as the case may be. Merely because a consolidated rent is being paid for the three premises from a particular point of time it is not permissible for the landlord to club the three premises together for seeking the relief against the tenant only under S.10 (3) (a) of the Act. It is very doubtful as to whether I the tenancy in respect of all the three premises, can be said to be a single one. This apart, admittedly this is not a case where the portions serving different purposes, residential and non -residential, are in one and the same premises, so as to attract the dictum of the Supreme Court recognised in Gopalakrishna Chetti v/s. Ganesan, 1976 1 MLJ (S.C.) 27. The factors to be considered for a case under S.10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act would be entirely different from the factors to be considered in a case under S.10 (3) (a) (2) or (3) of the Act. Hence, when the premises form different units and each will come within the meaning of a 'building' under S. 2(2)of the Act and the purposes, which they serve would be different the clubbing of these premises together for the purpose of obtaining reliefs under the provisions of the Act will cause prejudice to the tenant. In this view, a single petition which the landlord resorted to for evicting the tenant from the three premises cannot be countenanced.

(3.) The second point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is equally tenable. Learned counsel for the petitioner points out that the landlord setthelawin motion under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, which should be invoked only where the premises let out is residential and where the requirement of the landlord is also residential. In the instant case, one of the premises is non -residential, the same being used for banking business. The landlord has not projected a case that he requires the nonresidential premises for any non -residential purpose within the meaning of S. 10(3)(a)(2) of the Act, S.10 (3) (a) (3)being applicable only to a non -residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use. By clubbing the three premises together, the landlord cannot seek the eviction of the tenant from the nonresidential premises when he has not set forth a case for that relief. Venkatadri, J. in Bathool Bai v/s. Vidyanaihan : 1966 2 M.L.J. 412=79 L.W. 612. dealt with a case where the main and the substantial purpose of the letting was for residence and the learned Judge held that merely because the tenant (a Doctor) was using a part of the premises for his Dullness of running a pharmacy and that too, without the consent of the landlord, it will not disentitle the landlord from applying for possession of the building under S. 10(3)(a) of the Act. The learned Judge referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Gopaldas Verma v/s. S.K. Bharatwaj, A.I.R. 1943 S.C. 337 and distinguished the same on facts. In Gopaldas Verma v/s. Bhmradwaj, A.I.R. 1943 S.C. 337 the premises in dispute was only let for residential purposes but later with the consent of the landlord, a portion of the premises was used for non -residential purposes and the Supreme Court held that where the premises are let for residential purposes and it is shown that they are used by the tenant incidentally for commercial, professional or other purposes with the consent of the landlord, the landlord is not entitled to eject the tenant even if he proves that he needs the premises bona fide for his personal use because the premises have by their user ceased to be premises let for residential put -poses alone, in Miss. Sanyai v/s. Gianchand : A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 438 the ratio in Dr. Gopaldas Verma v/s. Bharadwaj, AIR 1943 S.C. 337 was reiterated by the Supreme Court. In Miss, Sanyal v/s. Gianchand : A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 438 the Supreme Court was considering a case under S. 13(1)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952, which runs as follows: