SUREKHA Vs. THE UNITED BANK OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The landlady is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition, which seeks to revise the orders of the courts below, dismissing an application filed by her for an order of eviction against the respondent herein under S. 10 (3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 23 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act. According to the case of the petitioner, she is the owner of the house bearing door No. 5, Sir Thegaraya Road, Madras -17, having purchased the same under a registered sale deed, dated 10 -3 -1975 and the first floor of the premises was even then tenanted by the respondents herein on a monthly rent of Rs. 400 the tenancy being reckoned according to English calendar. After the purchase by the petitioner, the respondent attorney the tenancy in favor of the petitioner. The petitioner claimed that the property was purchased by her with the intention of using the entire building for the residence of the petitioner and her family. Elaborating this requirement, the petitioner claimed that her husband is looking after the family charities and estate and he requires enough space in the building for the purpose of attending to the administration of the charities and their estate in order that it may facilitate proper administration of the same and in order to secure this, the petitioner stated that accommodation was necessary to enable her husband to do so. In addition, the petitioner also claimed that of her two daughters, one of them had reached marriageable age and separate and more convenient accommodation for her is necessary. After issuing a notice terminating the tenancy, the petitioner filed an application for eviction on the grounds referred to above. The respondent herein, contested this application on several grounds. The respondent admitted that it was a tenant of the first floor right from 1 -1 -1964 onwards. It was also further contended by the respondent that there were disputes between the petitioner and the respondent on account of a demand for increased rent by the petitioner which was not accepted by the respondent and this took the shape of interference by the petitioner with certain amenities enjoyed by the respondent, which resulted in an application by the respondent in HRC 928 of 1976 for the restoration of those amenities. The respondent further contended that the grounds put forth by the petitioner for additional accommodation are vague and totally devoid of particulars and that the provision of separate accommodation for the daughter of the petitioner is inconsistent with the accommodation claimed on behalf of the petitioner's husband. Another plea was also raised that the services of the respondent would fall under the classification of essential services and therefore no orders for eviction can be passed. The application by the petitioner was characterized as not bona fide and it was also stated that the application does not satisfy the requirements of S. 10(3)(c) of the Act.

(2.) The learned Rent Controller (7th Judge) Small Cause Court), Madras held that under Sec. 10(3) (c) of the Act, the petitioner cannot demand additional accommodation for and on behalf of the members of her family. Dealing with the claim of the respondent that it is engaged in essential services, the learned Rent Controller held that the respondent is not entitled to claim any immunity from eviction on this ground. The learned Rent Controller further held 'that the hardship, which may be caused to the petitioner, if this petition is not allowed, will outweigh the numerous advantages put to the respondent herein'. On these conclusions, the application was dismissed. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner herein preferred an appeal in HRA No. 322 of 1977, to the Appellate Authority (Second Judges, Small Cause Court, Madras). The Appellate Authority held, concurring with the learned Rent Controller, that under S. 10(3) (c) the landlord can seek additional accommodation only for the business which she was carrying on and not for the purpose of her husband's business'. On this finding, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal.

(3.) In this Civil Revision Petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contends that the interpretation of S. 10 (3) (c) of the Act by the courts below is incorrect. According to him the words 'if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be "should be given a liberal interpretation and in order to attract the section, it is not necessary that the need should be exclusively personal to the landlord. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contends that the provision has to be strictly interpreted and the personal requirement of the landlord either for business or by way of additional accommodation only is within the contemplation of the section. Before proceeding to consider the rival contentions raised, the provisions of the Sec. in so for as they are relevant for the purpose of the present case may be referred to. S. 10 (3) (c) runs thus: