(1.) THE question that arises for determination in both these applications is the same, whether the Court -fee payable on the plaint in each of these cases had to be calculated under the provisions of S. 41(1) of the Madras Court -fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 (Act 14 of 1955), or under the provisions of the residuary section, S. 50 of that Act. The learned subordinate Judge held that S. 41 (1) provided the basis for the calculation of the Court -fee payable on each of the plaints.
(2.) BOMMANNA Chettiar, the second defendant in OS. No. 93 of 1957, and Abu Bucker, the first defendant in OS. No. 21 of 1958 were income -tax assessees. For the arrears payable by them, certificates were issued to the Collector under S. 46 of the IT Act. To realise these arrears the Collector attached certain properties. Claims were preferred that these properties had ceased to be properties of the assessees. These claims were allowed by the Collector, and the properties were released from attachment. The IT Department thereupon filed the two suits to set aside the summary orders passed by the Collector in the earlier proceedings, which resulted in the claims being allowed and the attachments being raised. On each of the plaints Court - fee was paid by the Department as plaintiff under S. 50 of the Madras Court -fees and Suits Valuation Act. Objection was taken to that by the Court -fee Examiner, and, as I have pointed out earlier, the learned subordinate Judge held that Court -fee was payable under S. 41(1) of the Act. Sec. 41(1) runs :
(3.) THUS , at least four classes are included within the definition of Court for the purposes of the Madras Court -fees and Suits Valuation Act : (1) civil Courts, (2) revenue Courts, (3) criminal Courts, and (4) any Tribunal or authority having jurisdiction under any special or local law to decide questions affecting the rights of parties. The Collector in this case was authorised by S. 46(2) to recover the arrears of income -tax due from the assessees as arrears of land revenue. Obviously, in realising the arrears of land revenue the Collector does not constitute either a civil of a revenue Court. There can be no question, of course, of his constituting a criminal Court. No doubt, under the proviso to S. 46(2), the Collector can exercise additional powers, but still those powers are exercised only to realise the arrears of income -tax as arrears of land revenue. It was in exercise of those powers that the Collector had to decide whether the claims were well -founded, that is, whether the properties were not liable to attachment. In assuming and exercising that jurisdiction, he exercised the powers of a civil Court under the proviso to S. 46(2). That made the Collector only a "Tribunal or other authority having jurisdiction under any special or local law to decide questions affecting the rights of parties." The proviso to S. 46(2) did not itself constitute the Collector a civil Court within the meaning of S. 3(ii) of the Madras Court -fees and Suits Valuation Act. It should be remembered that S. 41(1) is applicable not to all orders passed by any Court but only to orders passed by a civil or a revenue Court. It was not the case of any one that the Collector constituted a revenue Court in these proceedings. He did not constitute a civil Court either, though under the proviso to S. 46(2) of the IT Act he exercised the powers of a civil Court. Even in the IT Act itself the powers of a civil Court have been conferred on other authorities, officers of the IT Department itself. But it should be taken as well -settled that, merely because they exercise those powers in the course of assessment proceedings or appeals arising therefrom, they do not constitute civil Courts. A Tribunal exercising the powers of a civil Court under the CPC for certain limited purposes is not constituted a civil Court by the mere provision for the exercise of those powers; and there is nothing more than the proviso to S. 46(2) of the IT Act in this case to furnish any basis for holding that the Collector, while exercising the powers of a civil Court, himself constituted a civil Court within the meaning of S. 3(ii) and S. 41(1) of the Madras Court -fees and Suits Valuation Act.