THALAI VADIVU ANANDAR Vs. VENUGOPALA CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Appeal against the Judgment of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in C.M.S.A. No. 130 of 1954 arises in the following circumstances. One Marudappa Chettiar filed O.S. No. 675 of 1952 in the Court of the District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli, against Venugopala Chettiar, the respondent herein, for recovery of possession of the property in dispute and for past and future rents. In that suit the parties entered into a compromise and based on that compromise the Court passed a decree directing the respondent herein to deliver possession of the property by 15th March, 1954 and also to pay past and future rents. As the respondent failed to deliver possession by the prescribed date, the plaintiff -decree -holder filed E.P. No. 240 of 1954 on 18th March, 1954, for delivery of possession. An order for delivery was passed on 12th April, 1954, directing delivery by 10th June, 1954. On 15th April, 1954, the respondent filed an appeal to the District Court, Tiruchirapalli, against the order for delivery (A.S. No. 177 of 1954). In that appeal he obtained on ex parte order of stay on 15th April, 1954, itself. On 27th May, 1954, the original decree -holder Marudappa Chettiar died. On 8th July, 1954, the District Court dismissed A.S. No. 177 of 1954 on the ground that the order of delivery was right. The learned Judge inter alia observed as follows:

(2.) APPARENTLY the view taken by the learned District Judge was that Section 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act would not make the original order for possession ipso facto invalid, but it might be that the judgment -debtor could object to actual eviction in pursuance of the order. After the dismissal of his appeal the respondent filed an application, E.A. No. 845 of 1954 on 12th July, 1954, for Stay of execution. Meanwhile the son of Marudappa Chettiar, the present appellant before us, filed an application on the same day that he may be added as legal representative of the decree -holder praying for a decree directing delivery of possession of the suit property to him. The ground taken by the respondent was that the Rent Control Act had been extended to the village in which the property was situated on and from 16th June, 1954 and therefore the decree -holder's legal representative could not evict him. The learned District Munsif of Tiruchirapalli overruled the respondent's objection and brought the appellant before us as the legal representative of the deceased decree -holder and passed again another order for delivery of possession to the legal representative. Against this order of the District Munsif the respondent filed an appeal, A.S. No. 261 of 1954 which was heard and disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge of Tiruchirapalli. He dismissed the appeal on the ground that Section 7 of the Act would not apply to pending execution proceedings, that is to say, to the prior execution petition wherein an order for eviction had already been passed. From this order the respondent preferred an appeal to this Court, C.M.S.A. No. 130 of 1954 which came up for decision before Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. The only question argued before him was whether the Rent Control Act whose application had been extended to the village in which the property was situated only on 16th June, 1954, would prevent the eviction of Venugopala Chettiar except in accordance with Section 7 of that Act. The learned Judge after an elaborate discussion of the several decisions cited before him held that Section 7 of the Act does apply and is a complete answer to the claim of the decree -holder's legal representative to evict the respondent. The learned Judge therefore allowed the appeal and dismissed the execution petition filed by the decree -holder's legal representative but granted leave to file a Letters Patent Appeal.

(3.) IT was contended before the Division Bench that the moment a person files a suit he obtains thereby a vested right to have applied not only to the suit, but to all execution proceedings also, the law relating to execution as it existed at the time of filing the suit. The learned Judges had no difficulty in rejecting this contention as they were not aware of any such principle. They found no reason to think that if a new law is introduced restricting the right to execute, execution proceedings can nevertheless be instituted if such a right existed on the date of the filing of the suit. The observations of Sulaiman, J., in The United Provinces w. Mt. Atica Begaun, (1941) 1 M.L.J. Sup. F.C. 65, were relied on behafore the Division Bench but the learned Judges did not agree that the observations in any way affected their decision. Actually in that case the decree was passed after Clause 8 of the Non -Residential Buildings Rent Control Order had been amended in the manner aforesaid. The execution petition was filed subsequently. The decision of the learned Judge was that Clause 8 prohibited the decree -holder from filing an execution petition, his only way of evicting the tenant being to file an application before the Rent Controller. No doubt there is a reference to pending proceedings in one part of the judgment but it was not necessary to deal with the point because they held that during the interval between the passing of the decree and the filing of the execution petition there was no pending proceeding. The basis of the decision is certainly against the view that Clause 8 would not affect pending proceedings. Mr. Narayanaswami Ayyar relied upon the decision of Mockett, J., in Moothaliandan Chetti v. Venkatesam Chetti : AIR1945Mad386 . In that case the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes dismissed an application for ejectment. That application was filed on 18th March, 1944. There was a sub -letting of a portion in June, 1943. Possession was to be given on 14th April. On 14th April the plaintiff when he sought to obtain possession was obstructed by the respondent. Thereupon an application was made to the Small Cause Court and that Court dismissed the application. The learned Judge adverted to the difference in the language between the old Section 7 -A, Madras House Rent Control Order and the new Section 7 -A. The learned Judge took the view that the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction to invoke the new provision and construe it to operate retrospectively. He allowed therefore the revision petition before him and set aside the order of the Small Cause Court. In the concluding portion of his judgment there are certain observations which really are pertinent for the disposal of this case, namely: