PENTAKOTA NARYUDU Vs. YELLAPU VENKATA RAMANAMURTHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This civil revision petition has been filed against the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Vizagapatam in A. S. No. 145 of 1944 affirming the decree of the District Munsif in a suit for rent for 1939 -1940 and 1940 -1941 in respect of certain lands situated in the zamindari village of Madgole. The amount of the claim was less than Rs. 500/ - and hence the case comes to this Court by way of a civil revision petition. The contention of the defendants, here petitioners, is that the lands in respect of which rent is claimed are ryoti lands, that they are tenants with a permanent right of occupancy and that the suit for rent was cognizable only by a revenue Court. The respondents' case, accepted by the Courts below, is that the lands are his private lands and the suit for rent was, therefore, rightly filed in the civil Court. It is stated for the petitioners that this finding is erroneous and that the lower appellate Court has misdirected itself in law in arriving at this conclusion.

(2.) THERE was some discussion at the bar as regards the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court in cases like the present, the respondents' contention being that the findings of the lower appellate Court on the issues of fact and law are not open to review by this Court under Section 115, Civil P. C. Reliance was placed on their behalf on the recent decision of the Privy Council in Venkatagiri lyengar v. H.R.E. Board where the Board upset the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, the ground of reversal being that even the misconstruction of a vital document governing the rights and liabilities of the parties was merely an error of law which, however grave, did not justify interference in revision under Section 115, Civil P. C. In so holding, the Judicial Committee reiterated their earlier views in Amir Hasan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, 11 cal. 6 : 11 I. A. 237 P. C. and Bala -krishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar, 40 Mad. 793 : A. I. R. (4) 1917 P. C. 71. All that the Judicial Committee laid down in this triology of cases was that where a Court had jurisdiction to determine a question of fact or law and it deter -mined that question, it cannot be said that it had acted illegally or with material irregularity, however erroneous its determination might be and the High Court could not correct the error in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The position here is different. The suit was for rent due in respect of lands situate in an'estate' and was tried and decreed by the District Munsif and his decree was affirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge. Neither of the lower Courts would have had jurisdiction to try the case unless the lands in question were proved to be 'private lands' of the landholder, the presumption being that they are not. The objection here is to the jurisdiction of the lower Courts based both on the character of the Tribunal and the nature of the subject -matter of the dispute and does not rest merely on the ground that the lower appellate Court has erroneously found a fact or point of law, which though essential to the validity of its decree, it was competent to enquire into and decide, If the Court below has, by a decision which is found to be erroneous, given itself jurisdiction to try a suit which it has no power to entertain, this Court can interfere under Section 115, Civil P. C. The recent decision of the Judicial Committee referred to above deals with a different situation, namely, an erroneous decision on a question of law after jurisdiction had been legally assumed. Here the very basis and foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court below rests on the correctness of the conclusion of the lower Court as regards the character of the lands in question and if I find that the Courts below assumed jurisdiction to try the suit for rent on an erroneous finding as to the character of the lands, I can interfere under Section 115, Civil P. C., see Atchayya v. Venkata Seetharamachandra Rao, 39 Mad. 195 : A. I. R. (2) 1915 Mad. 1223. Both in Amir Hasan Khan's case, 11 cal. 6 and in Venkatagiri lyengar v. H. R. E. Board, 1949 -1 M. L. J. 505 the Subordinate Court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute and while exercising that admitted jurisdiction, came to an erroneous conclusion on questions of law like limitation and the construction of a document. In Balakrishna Odayar v. Vasudeva, lyer, 40 Mad. 793, the District Judge by a misconstruction of a statutory provision had given himself jurisdiction to direct an election to a temple committee. This Court set aside in revision the order of the District Judge accepting the result of the election and recognising and confirming the person elected as a member of the temple committee. The Privy Council held that as a question of jurisdiction was involved, the High Court had power to interfere in revision and reverse the order of the District Judge. Section 115, Civil P. C., is intended inter alia to keep subordinate Courts within the limits of their jurisdiction. Neither the trial Court can give jurisdiction to itself, nor can the appellate Court give jurisdiction to the trial Court, by an erroneous decision and in either case, this Court is competent to interfere in revision. See a recent decision of thePrivy Council in Joychand Lal Balu v. Kama -lakshan Chowdry , reported after the arguments were heard in this case.

(3.) IT is common ground that the lands are situate in the zamindari village of Madgole. Section 3 (10) (a), Madras Estates Land Act defines 'private land' as the domain or home farm land of the land holder by whatever designation known such as kambattam, khas, sir or pannai. The rest of the definition has no application to the present case, because it is not the case of the landlords that the lands have been cultivated as private land by themselves or by their own servants for a continuous period of 12 years immediately before Act I [1] of 1908 came into operation. Under Section 185 (2) and (3), Madras Estates Land Act, in determining whether any land is the landholder's private land, regard shall be had to the question whether the land was before 1st July 1898 specially let as private land and any other evidence that may be produced. There is a proviso that the land shall be presumed not to be private land until the contrary is proved. There has been, in my judgment, some amount of misconception as regards the meaning of the words 'domain' or 'home farm land' of the landholder - -expressions found in Section 3 (10) (a) of the Act. To interpret these words as confined to 'land immediately surroun -ding the mansion or dwelling house, the park or chase of a Lord' which would be the dictionary meaning of these English words, is to the import feudal ideas of medieval England into the system of land tenures in this Court without adequate justification. The English draftsman of the Bill which afterwards became the Madras Estates Land Act as well as the English Revenue Member of the Executive Council of the day who piloted the Bill through the Legislature employed the expression 'domain' and 'home -farm' as the nearest English equivalents of the Tamil and Telugu words 'Pannai' 'Kambhat -tam' 'Seri', etc. It is all very well when talking of the demesne lands of an English Duke of Marquis to use the term as denoting the land appurtenant to the mansion of the lord of the manor. The manorial system was not prevalent in this country. Zamindara lived in cities and forts for reasons of security and their private lands were not confined to the vacant spaces surrounding their palaces or residence. It is a far fetched construction to impute to the Madras Legislature an intention to incorporate the English conception of 'demesne land' as a test for differentiating the public domain from private land in a zamindari. I very respectfully venture to think that Wadsworth O. C. J., unduly narrowed the meaning of the expression 'private lands' when he defined it as 'land appurtenant to the landholder's residence and kept for his enjoyment and use' and 'as land which the landholder farms himself as distinct from land Which he leases out to tenants to be farmed.' Jagadesam Pillai v. Kuppammal, I.L.R. (1946) Mad. 687 : A. I. R. (33) 1946 Mad. 214. Direct or personal cultivation may be and is often a useful test for determining the character of land in an estate that is to say whether it is private land or ryoti land but leasing by itself is not fatal to the claim that the land in question is private land.