K DASAPPA Vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an applies-tion by a person detained under the Madias Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1917 (Madras Act I of 1957) to this Court for the issue of a direction in the nature of Jialeas corpus under. Section 431, Criminal P. C. The applicant was arrested on 25th April I9i8 Under Section 151, Criminal P. C. by the police authorities and an order for his detention wag passed by the District Magistrate of South Kanara on 29th April 1948. On 10th June 1948 the applicant received a communication from the Provincial Government containing the grounds for his detention, He submitted his explanation in due course. The advisory com. mittee considered the matter and we are informed that on 17th February 1943, the Government o Madras have passed final orders for the detention of the applicant.

(2.) MR. N. S. Mani, the learned Counsel for the applicant, raised four grounds in support of his application. The first contention was that the order for detention itself showed that the District Magistrate did not satisfy himself with respect to the applicant that he was acting or about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order and that it wag necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from so doing. Reliance is placed on the form of the order, the relevant portion of which runs in these terms : WHEREAS I, Setu Rao Kalwar, District Magistrate of South Kanara, am satisfied with respect to Dasappa, Master of Balla village that he is acting or about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and maintenance of public order and that with a view to preventing him from so doing, it is neeeasary to detain him. The argument is that the order does not state whether the applicant is acting or is about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety and that it is merely a reproduction of the language of Section 2 of the Act. It is contended that the District Magistrate ought to have satisfied himself about one of two things, namely that the applicant was acting or was about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety and that since he had not dore so, the requirement of Section 2, Sub-sections (1) was not complied with. We consider this objection to the form of the order to be an unsubstantial one. We are supported in our opinion by the judgment of the Federal Court in King. Emperor v. Sibnath Barterjee (1944) F. C. B 1 at p. 41 : A. I. R. (30) 1943 F. C. 75 : 45 Jr. L. J. 341. The relevant passage in the judgment of the Chief Justice is as follows : It has been suggested that (1) the form of the recital indicates by use of the word 'or' that no final consideration has been given to each case and that all that the investigating authority has done has been to form a rough conclusion that the case may come within one or other of the reasons quoted and that (2) the use of a cyclostyled form of order indicates a like lack of careful considnritiou, and that therefore the order is not good ex facie. I do not accept those arguments. In any judgment the form of recital is one which a layman might reasonably use when he was satisfied that the casemate come within one or other of the specified categories without being prepared to pledge himsell with legal exactitude to any particular one or more of the categories. The objection, therefore, to the form of the order fails.

(3.) THE' next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that as the applicant had been arrested Under Section 151, Criminal P. C. on 25th April 1918 and the order of detention was passed on 29th April I9d8, it could not be said that the District Magistrate was satisfied at the time the petitioner was arrested that he was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. The arrest Under Section 151, Criminal P, C, might have been in respect of a cognisable offence wholly unconnected with public safety or maintenance of public order. The detention under Madras Act, I [1] of 1947, is in the interests of public safety or maintenance of public order and the scope of S,151, Criminal P. C. and Sections 2 to 4, Madras Act I [1] of 1947, are entirely different. We do not consider that simply because a man hag been arrest-ed Under Section 151, Criminal P. C. , the powers under Madras Act I [1] of 1947 could not be exercised and the person so arrested could not be detained thereunder. There is also some authority for this view in the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Modi Chand and Ors. v. Bex 1948 A. L. J. 81; A. I. R. (35) 1948 ALL. 281 : 49 Or. L. 3, 352. The head-note of the case of the Allahabad High Court is in these terms : The mere fact that certain persons were first arrested under some provisions of the ordinary law and were kier ordered to be detained under the U, P. Maintenance of Order (Temporary) Act, is not, in itself, proof of mala fides and it is for the person arrested to adduce further oiraurustanees or evidence to show that the executive authorities acted mala fide. In the present case, there is no ground for hold-ing that the action under Madras Act I [l] of 1947 wa3 actuated by any ulterior motive or im-proper purpose and that with a view to attain that object, the previous arrest Under Section 151, Criminal P. C. was made. This contention of the petitioner is unsustainable.