(1.) THE legal representatives of the plaintiff, who originally filed the second appeal and died during its pendency, are the appellants. The suit out of which this second appeal has arisen was filed for a declaration that a decree obtained by the defendant against one Alamelu Ammal, widow of Kothandapani Pillai, was not binding on the estate of Kothandapani to which the plaintiff had succeeded as reversioner on the death of the widow. Kothandapani died on 12th February, 1925, leaving landed properties to which his widow Alamelu succeeded as his heir. On 25th December, 1926, she executed a promissory note (Ex. D -1) for Rs. 600 in favour of one Krishnaswami Naidu who endorsed it on 18th September, 1934, in favour of the defendant in the present suit who sued Alamelu, the maker of the note, and obtained an ex parte decree against her in O.S. No. 367 of 1934,. on the file of the District Munsiff's Court of Negapatam for the amount due under the promissory note. The relevant portion of the decree (Ex.,D -5) was in these terms:
(2.) COUNSEL for the appellant has put forward various contentions. It is argued that the decree in O.S. No. 367 of 1934 has not been, on a proper construction, passed against the estate of the deceased Kothandapani as such, but only against, the widow Alamelu and therefore it is not executable against the properties of Kothandapani in the hands of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not the heir -at -law or legal representative of the widow. Therefore it is said that the estate of Kothandapani in his hands is not liable to satisfy a decree against the widow. Reference is made in this connection to a decision of Wallace, J., in Narasimiah v. Jawanthraj Sowcar, (1926) 52 M.L.J. 299. With reference to a decree passed under circumstances and in terms similar to those of Ex. D -5, the learned Judge observed that it did not direct that : '
(3.) EVEN assuming that the decision in Maruthamuthu Naicken v. : AIR1938Mad377 applies to a case like the present and confines the remedy of an endorsee of a promissory note executed by a Hindu widow to a decree against her personally the decree in O.S. No. 367 of 1934 was passed against the estate in the hands of the widow at a time when the view of the Madras High Court was that an endorsee of a promissory note executed by the manager of a joint Hindu family could sue the maker as well as the other members of the family and obtain a decree against the latter to the extent of the joint family property in their hands on proof that the debt for which the promissory note was executed, was binding on the family Nataraja Naicken v. Ayyasami Pillai, (1916) 32 M.L.J. 354. This view has no doubt been since overruled by the Full Bench. But if the decree in O.S. No. 367 of 1934, obtained against the widow is otherwise binding on the estate, it cannot be challenged by a rever -sioner who succeeded to the estate on the ground that it was passed on a view of the law declared to be erroneous by later judicial decisions. The bar of res judicata does not depend upon the question whether the prior decision is correct or erroneous on the facts or in law. Even though Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code is not strictly applicable to the case, an adjudication against a Hindu widow will, in certain circumstances, bind the estate, the law being thus stated by the Judicial Committee: