LAWS(MAD)-1949-11-18

REV A RAMPUS Vs. ALUMURI SUBBA REDDI

Decided On November 23, 1949
REV.A.RAMPUS Appellant
V/S
ALUMURI SUBBA REDDI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition by four persons namely the Rev. A. Rampus, K. John, Mahomed Baig and Nagi Reddi against the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Cuddappah, attaching, under Section 145, Criminal P. C., certain lands (with trees) regarding which there was an imminent danger of a breach of the peace. The learned counsel for the petitioners does not press the attack on the attachment of the lands themselves. The only prayer of the petitioners, he urges before me, is that, even before the preliminary order was passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, petitioners 3 and 4, Mahomed Baig and Nagi Reddi, had felled some trees standing on the lands, and severed them, and that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no power to attach these severed trees as per the ruling of Bardswell J. in Panga Thathalu Reddi v. Panga Pedda Paramma, 1934 M. W. N. Cr. 77 : (1934 M. W. N. 405). I have looked into that ruling and I do not consider that it will apply to the facts of this case, Bard well J. simply says, in that ruling, that crops which have been harvested (and carried away) before the date of the preliminary order will not come within the meaning of the phrase "crops or other produce" of the land in Section 145 (2), Criminal P. C. Obviously, he could not have meant that crops or trees just severed but not carried away from the lands, could not be covered by an order of attachment. If that were so, not only crops or trees cut by such fighting parties but also pillars pulled down from a disputed house, gold, silver, manganese, mica and other valuable minerals quarried from the disputed land in huge quantities and lying there still, could not be attached but only the pits from which these valuable minerals have been quarried. That Bardswell J. meant his order to apply only to crops harvested and carried away is clear also not only from the commonsense view stated above but also from the reading of his order as a whole and from the judgment of Malik J. in Emperor v. Gaya Prasad, I. L. R. (1947) ALL. 741: (A. I. R. (35) 1948 ALL. 94: 49 Cr. L. J. 15). Malik J. has held there that trees which have been severed from lands covered by a dispute involving a likelihood of the breach of peace but which are still lying at the spot (and not carried away) will be covered by the phrase "crops or produce of land" in Section 145 (2), Criminal P. C. I have not been shown any other ruling regarding this interesting point. The object of Section 145, Criminal P. C. namely to prevent a breach of the peace, by such attachment, will be largely defeated if disputed trees lying severed on the land are not also attached. I may add that these very petitioners viz., the abovesaid Mahomed Baig, Nagi Reddi, Rev. A. Rampus and K. John, put in Criminal Misc. P. No. 1659 of 1948 in this Court for suspending the operation of the attachment order, and specifically wanted a suspension regarding the attachment of these trees which had been cut and severed by petitioners 3 and 4. But that petition was dismissed by Subba Rao J. on 23rd September 1948 itself. It is significant that in that petition, as also in this it is not stated that the trees-were cut and carried away, but merely that they were cut and severed, thereby showing clearly that they had been only cut and severed by one of these fighting disputants, and not removed from the place before the attachment.

(2.) SO I see no reason whatever to interfere with the order of attachment of the lands and trees passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. In my opinion, his order is correct and proper in its entirety, and it was amply warranted by the extensive provisions of Section 145, Criminal P. C. As Malik J. has remarked, the provisions of Section 145, Criminal P. C., must be very liberally interpreted in order to arm the Magistrates with sufficient power to attack properties in dispute between fighting factions and persons, and prevent breaches of the peace. Indeed, Section 145, Criminal P. C., gives the power to a Magistrate even to direct a party to restore properties whose possession has been forcibly taken from others within two months before the order. It is obvious, therefore, that trees which have just been cut and severed a few hours or days before the preliminary order and are still lying on or near the lands must be within the clear purview of a Magistrate who can restore possession of the lauds itself with all the trees etc., on it, on the ground of taking forcible possession within two months before. 3. This petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.