BALASUBRAMANIA AND COMPANY Vs. PENUKONDA RADHAKRISHNAMURTHY AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE decision of this Court in O.S.A. No. 49 of 1947, no doubt reversed the decision of the learned Judge on the Original Side and therefore our decree is not an affirming decree. It is also clear that the appeal does involve a substantial question of law. But the objection raised to the grant of leave to appeal to the Federal Court is that the condition in section no, first paragraph, viz., that the amount or value of the subject -matter of the suit in the Court of first instance must be Rs. 10,000 or upwards is not satisfied. Under the award the sum payable was Rs. 9,682 -8 -0 with interest thereon at six per cent per annum from the date of the award. Calculating interest till 17th July, 1946, the date of the filing of the Original Petition No. 153 of 1946 to pass a decree in terms of the award, the amount comes only to Rs. 9,896 -3 -0, which is less than the required amount. To get over this difficulty Mr. Radhakrishnayya, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that in this case the Court of first instance must be deemed to be the Arbitrator before whom the claim exceeded Rs. 10,000. In support of his contention he relied upon the ruling of the Judicial Committee in Ramdutt Ramkissendass v. E.D. Sassoon and Co., (1928) 56 M.L.J. 614 :, L.R. 56 IndAp 128 :, I.L.R. 56 Cal. 1048 (P.C.) in which their Lordships held that in applying to an arbitration Article 115 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, effect should be given by analogy to Section 14 of the Act so as to exclude the time occupied by the plaintiff acting bona fide and with diligence in obtaining a previous award on the same cause of action. Their Lordships held that,

(2.) IT was also urged before us that in any event the petitioner will be entitled to a certificate under Clause (c) of Section 109 of the Code that this is a fit case for appeal to the Federal Court because it involves a point of general importance, public as well as private. It is true, as already mentioned, there is a substantial question of law. But it is not every substantial question of law that can be treated as a question of public importance to justify the grant of a certificate under Section 109 (c). On an analysis of the judgment of this Court in appeal, it is clear that the decision ultimately depended upon the peculiar facts of this case and not on any general legal considerations. We therefore do not think that this is a case which can be certified to be a fit case for appeal under section log (c) of the Code.

(3.) THE application is therefore dismissed.