KORADA ATCHANNA Vs. JAYANTI SEETHARAMASWAMI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The defendant is the appellant in this second appeal. The suit was filed by a landholder for ejectment of his tenant on the expiry of the term of his lease and for rent. The appellate Court passed a decree in ejectment, but dismissed the claim for rent on the ground that it was cognizable only by the revenue Court. The tenant has preferred this second appeal against the decree in ejectment while the landlord has preferred a memorandum of cross-objections regarding the disallowance of the claim for rent. The land which is the subject-matter of the suit is part of and situated in a whole inam village which became an "estate" by reason of Madras Act, XVIII [18] of 1936. In O. S. No. 197 of 1933 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Vizianagaram, the landholder obtained a decree dated 5th July 1933 for ejectment of the tenants then occupying the land without any contest on the part of those tenants, The defendant was let into possession of the land by the plaintiff on 26th June 1936 under a kadappa for a year but the lease was renewed subsequently every year till 1943. The present suit for ejectment and rent was brought in 1944 on the expiry of the term of the last kadappa dated 10th April 1943. The above facts are either admitted or have been found concurrently by the Courts below and the arguments in this Court proceeded on the basis of their correctness.

(2.) Mr. Dhikshitulu, the learned counsel for the appellant, argued that Section 8 (5), Madras Estates Land Act (hereinafter called the Act) as amended in 1936 on which the claim of the laud, holder for eviction was based does not apply to the present case. First he contended that there was here no final decree or order of a competent civil Court establishing that the tenant had no occupancy right in the suit laud, the decree passed in O. S. No. 197 of 1933 on the file of the District Munsif's Court of Vizianagaram for ejectment of the tenants then on the land, having been passed without any issue being raised or adjudication given as regards the existence or otherwise of occupancy rights in the land. There, fore, it is argued, that the first requirement of Section 8 (5) of the Act is not satisfied. I am unable to agree with this contention. In my opinion, the requirement of Section 8 (5) is satisfied if there had been a final decree for ejectment of the tenants on the land before 1st November 1933 and that was the case here. It is not necessary that the judgment or decree should contain a specific declaration that the tenant had no right of occupancy in the land. If there was a decree in ejectment in the face of which the tenant who was a party to the decree could not set up occupancy rights in the land, even though the decree itself did not specifically state that the tenant had no occupancy rights the case, in my opinion, would fall within Section 8 (5) of the Act.

(3.) The next contention of Mr. Dikshitulu raises a somewhat difficult question relating to the construction of Section 6, Expln. (2), read with Section 8 (5) of the Act as amended. Section 8 (5) was intended to give a limited measure of protection to Inamdars, like the present plaintiff, whose lands became an estate within Section 3, Clause (2) (d) of the Act as amended by the Act XVIII [18] of 1936 and lays down an exception to the general rule enacted in Section 6 of the Act by postponing for a period of 12 years, the operation of Section 6 with reference to the lands falling within Section 8 (5). To claim the benefit of Section 8 (5) in respect of land other than his private land, the landholder has to prove not only that a final decree of a competent Court has been obtained before 1st November 1933 but also that no tenant has acquired a right of occupancy in the land before the commencement of the Amending Act XVIII [18] of 1936. I have held that the first condition is satisfied in the present case, but it is argued that the second condition has not been satisfied.