T.A. MENON Vs. K.P. PARVATHI AMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition raises, among others, an important question of jurisdiction for a petition under Section 6, Madras Marumakkatayam Act (XXII [22] of 1933). The petitioner is the husband. The respondent is the wife. They are persons governed by the Marumakattayam law of inheritance. They were married on 22nd March 1941. The marriage was celebrated at Behala, in West Bengal. The husband is a member of the Indian Civil Service permanently employed in West Bengal. The parties entered into a deed of dissolution of marriage on 10th October 1947, the validity of which is however not admitted by the petitioner. On 6th January 1948, the husband filed Title Suit No. 10 of 1948 on the file of the Third Court of Munsif of Alipore, 24 Parganas, against his wife and mother -in -law for restitution of conjugal rights and for a decree declaring that the deed of dissolution of marriage dated 10th October 1947 was obtained fraudulently and was not binding on the parties to it. The wife filed a suit in the Madras City Civil Court O. S. No. 61 of 1948 for a declaration that the deed of dissolution was valid and binding on her husband, the petitioner. She filed an application in the High Court of Calcutta for transfer of the Title Suit No. 10 of 1948 from the Third Court of Munsif, Alipore, 24 Parganas to the City Civil Court, Madras, and by an order of the High Court dated 14th July 1948, the said application was dismissed. The wife filed C. P. No. 111 of 1947 in the District Munsif's Court of Palghat under Section 6, Madras Marumakkatayam Act for dissolution of the marriage and the husband applied to the District Munsif of Alipore for an injunction restraining the wife from proceeding with C. P. No. 111 of1947. An order of injunction was passed by the Munsif of Alipore restraining the wife from proceeding with her petition for dissolution in the Court of the District Munsif of Palghat. This order of injunction was received by the District Munsif of Palghat with a request not to proceed with the trial of O. P. No. 111 of 1947. This was received by the District Munsif on 30th August 1948. The learned District Munsif proceeded with the trial of the wife's petition for dissolution and passed an order on 8th September 1948 dissolving the marriage.

(2.) THE main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner husband is that the District Munsif of Palghat had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The wife alleges in her petition that the marriage was solemnised at Calcutta but that the husband had a permanent dwelling in Elapully village within the jurisdiction of the District Munsif's Court of Palghat. If in fact he had a permanent dwelling within the jurisdiction of the District Munsif's Court, then certainly the petition is maintainable. Section 7 (1) (i) of the Act reads as follows: 'A husband or wife may present a petition for dissolution of the marriage if the place where the marriage was contracted or the respondent has a permanent dwelling or actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, at the time the petition is presented, is situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Munsif in such Court.' The question of the place of marriage does not arise here as it is admittedly outside the jurisdiction of the District Munsif's Court of Palghat. But the relevant portion of the section for consideration would be whether the husband had a permanent dwelling or actually and voluntarily resided within the jurisdiction of the Court. There is no decision that has been placed before me interpreting the meaning of these words with reference to this Act but the jurisdictional provisions in other enactments have been cited before me where the same words or similar words occur. Section 20, Civil P. C., gives jurisdiction to the Court to try a suit under Clause (a) if the defendant or each of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. Explanation I says that where a person has a permanent dwelling at one place and also a temporary residence at another place, he shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause of action arising at the place where he has such temporary residence. Under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, jurisdiction is vested in the High Court if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business, or personally works for gain, within such limits. In Mahomed Shuffi v. Laldin Abdulla, 3 Bom. 227 it is stated that the meaning to be given to the word 'residence' in legislative enactments depends upon the intention of the Legislature in framing the particular provision in which the word is used and residence intended in Section 380, Civil P. C., (Act X of 1877) is residence under such circumstances as would afford a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would be forthcoming when the suit was decided. It is observed by Sargent J that: 'an attempt has occasionally been made to draw a distinction between the meaning of the words 'dwell' and 'reside' but they appear to me to express the same idea, the only difference being that they are perhaps, in ordinary usage, applied to different classes of society. Neither expression, however, necessarily implies a permanent state of things.'

(3.) LEVENE v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 1928 A. C. 217: 97 L. J. K. B. 377 has also been cited. It was a case under the Income -tax Act and their Lordships had to construe the words 'resident' and 'ordinarily resident'. There they recognized two residences for purposes of jurisdiction and held that a man may have two homes, one in London and the other in the country. In that case he was held to reside in both places and to be chargeable with tax.