M RAMACHANDRAN Vs. M M CHANDRASEKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff is the appellant. He filed the suit for a declaration that the decree dated 5.9.2006 in O.S.No. 7302 of 2006 obtained by the first respondent is null and void and for consequential injunction and also sought for interim injunction. By the decree dated 5.9.2006, the learned VIII Assistant City Civil Judge declared that the plaintiff was the adopted son of one Pitty Indrasenu and the second respondent herein. The importance of this declaration is interlinked with the fact that several educational institutions are administered by a Trust called Theagaraya Chetty Educational Institutions Managing Committee. It was founded by the philanthropist Pitty Theagaraya Chetty (Senior) and Pitty Theagaraya Chetty (Junior). There were internal disputes among the Trustees. A scheme was framed by the Supreme Court. Subsequently, there were other disputes and the consequence is that very often the Trustees are before this Court in one form of litigation or the other. If the respondent's status is accepted then he will have the right to represent the Pitty The garaya Chetty (Junior) Family in the Board of Trustees. The appellant claims that he is the great grandson of Pitty Theagaraya Chetty (Junior) through his daughter Kanniamma and according to him, the first respondent cannot claim any right of nomination on the basis of the decree which he alleges to be collusive. Therefore, the importance of the status flows from the fact that the recognition of the status would give the first respondent the right to be on the Board of Trustees and the denial of the status would take it away from him. The numerous litigations filed by the Trustees also underscore the struggle for power amongst the Trustees.

(2.) Pitty Indrasenu and his wife, the second respondent did not have any issues. According to the first respondent, he was adopted by them in 1969. In 2006, the first respondent filed the suit and obtained a decree. According to the appellant, it is rather curious that this suit was filed so many years after the execution of the adoption deed. The so-called adoption deed neither contains any recital of giving or taking of the adopted son nor has it been signed by the person giving adoption. More importantly, the natural father had denied the adoption by his letters dated 29.10.1999 which is signed by the first respondent himself and also by a subsequent letter dated 22.11.1999. It is also alleged that the first respondent is residing with his natural mother while the second respondent is languishing in an old age home. The decree was obtained on the basis of a memo filed by the natural mother and adoptive mother. According to the appellant, the adoption was not proved. So the suit was filed. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that adoption must be proved. There must be no suspicion. He submitted that the above letters were clear evidence that there was no adoption.

(3.) According to the first respondent, the adoption deed was a proof for valid adoption. His legal claim as an adopted son of Pitty Indrasenu and the second respondent was sought to be negated because of a single sentence in an order passed in Application No. 732 of 2006 that "All the facts now placed before this Court would at no stretch of imagination confer the right on Chandrasekar as adopted son." So, the respondent had to have his right declared and the suit was filed. The teamed counsel submitted that on the date of the suit, the only persons who had any say in the matter were the natural mother and the adopted mother and both of them were shown as defendants and they appeared before Court and they submitted to the decree. The learned counsel submitted that beyond this there was nothing further to be done. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent also submitted that the two letters were written as a reaction to certain decisions taken by the second respondent and did not reflect the correct statement of facts. Further, the learned counsel submitted that when there is a valid adoption Section 15 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1955 provides that the same cannot be cancelled by the adoptive father or the mother or any other person or even the adopted child renounce his status as such and cannot return to his family of birth. The learned counsel submitted that, when that is the legal position a mere letter written perhaps in a fit of anger cannot take away from the first respondent the status of the adopted son of Pitty Indrasenu and Leelavathi. The learned counsel also referred to other proceedings before this Court where the Pitty Theagaraya Chetty (Senior) branch had accepted the first respondent as an adopted son. This admission is the best evidence. The learned counsel submitted that such an admission was actually against the interest of the senior Branch. So it should be given due weight. He referred to the order passed by this Court on 19.10.1970 where the scheme had been amended pursuant to an agreement entered into between the adult male members of the family of Pitty Theagaraya Chetty (Senior) and the second respondent herein. The learned counsel also submitted that when there is a decree declaring the status of the first respondent as an adopted son until and unless that is set aside, its effect cannot be nullified, especially at the interlocutory stage. The prima facie case should be decided only on the basis of the decree granted on the suit filed by the first respondent.