LAWS(MAD)-2009-6-263

N GOPALAN Vs. K UDHAYAKUMAR

Decided On June 29, 2009
N. GOPALAN Appellant
V/S
K. UDHAYAKUMAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITION filed under section 482 Cr.P.C., to call for the records in C.C.No,493/2008 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate-II, Erode and to quash the same. The second accused in C.C.No,493/2008 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate-II, Erode has come forward with the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing the said criminal proceedings so far as the petitioner is concerned.

(2.) THE above said case, namely C.C.No,493/2008 was instituted on the file of the Judicial Magistrate-II, Erode against the wife of the petitioner herein (A1) and the petitioner herein(A2) for an alleged offence punishable under Section 138 r/w Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. THE respondent herein preferred a private complaint on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate-II, Erode against the wife of the petitioner herein and the petitioner herein arraying them as A1 and A2 respectively. It has been alleged in the complaint that the petitioner herein, being the authorised signatory of his wife, who is running a proprietary concern in the name and style of 'M/s.Darshini Fabrics', issued a cheque dated 21.06.2007 bearing No,439765 drawn on the account of the above said proprietary concern maintained with ING VYSYA bank for a sum of Rs.25,000/- in favour of the respondent herein for the discharge of a debt/liability. THE further averment made in the complaint is that the cheque, when presented for collection, was returned with a dishonour note "funds insufficient" that the petitioner and his wife, even after receiving the statutory notice, failed to make payment of the amount covered by the cheque as demanded in the notice and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

(3.) THOUGH the petitioner has taken a stand that the complaint has been lodged beyond the period of limitation as a ground for quashing the complaint, the learned counsel for the petitioner was fair enough to draw the attention of the court to the proviso to Section 142(b) which enables the court to take cognizance of the complaint even after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within the prescribed period and submitted that he would confine his arguments with regard to the second contention alone.