MURUGANANDAM Vs. PRINCIPAL DISTRICT COURT KANCHEEPURAM DISTRICT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has filed the above writ petition to quash the order passed by the first respondent in CMA (Co.op.) No.32/97 dt. 18.01.1999 confirming the order passed by the second respondent dt. 15.02.1997.

(2.) THE matter arises under the provision of Tamilnadu Co-operative Society Act 1983. THE issue relates to surcharge proceedings, which were initiated against the petitioner who is an employee of the third respondent's Co-operative Sugar Mills.

(3.) MR. R. Krishnaswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner would assail the correctness of the order on the ground that the store keeper, the fourth respondent was responsible for maintenance of the stock and he has been dismissed from the service and in the subsequent enquiry which was conducted against the petitioner, the enquiry officer has given a report on 15.09.1993 mentioning that the charges are not proved. In such circumstances, after inordinate delay of more than two years proceedings under section 87 of the Act have been initiated and that it is not sufficient to establish negligence on the part of the petitioner, but it is necessary to establish willful negligence. The learned counsel further contended that, from the impugned orders, it is clear that there is no record to show that there is any willful negligence on the part of the petitioner. Further, the report of the enquiry officer dated 15.09.1993 could be considered as a material to come to a conclusion that there is no willful negligence on the part of the petitioner and it is not a case of misappropriation, when there is no finding of any loss caused to the third respondent mill and both the second respondent as well as the Tribunal failed to take into consideration all the above facts. The learned counsel also submitted that surcharge notice was issued on 23.07.1996, for which the petitioner submitted his reply on 05.08.1996 and as per second proviso to Section 87 (1) of the Act, proceedings have to be completed before six months in aggregate, however the period of limitation expired on 23.01.1997 and the impugned order was passed only on 15.02.1997. Therefore, the learned counsel would contend that the entire proceedings are barred by limitation. Further, the learned counsel contended that there is no clear finding about misappropriation by both the authorities and the basis, on which such amount has been ordered to be recovered has not been stated and even if it is in proportion to the security deposit furnished each one at the time of joining service, it cannot be a yardstick for determining the amount payable. On all the above grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the writ petition deserved to be allowed.